Securities Arbitration in China: A Better Alternative to Retail Shareholder Protection by Weixia, Gu
Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business
Volume 33
Issue 2 Winter 2013
Winter 2013
Securities Arbitration in China: A Better Alternative
to Retail Shareholder Protection
Gu Weixia
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/njilb
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business by an authorized administrator of Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly
Commons.
Recommended Citation
Gu Weixia, Securities Arbitration in China: A Better Alternative to Retail Shareholder Protection, 33 Nw. J. Int'l L. & Bus. 283 (2013).
http://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/njilb/vol33/iss2/1
   
 
283 
Securities Arbitration in China: A 
Better Alternative to Retail 
Shareholder Protection 
By Gu Weixia* 
Abstract: There is a large body of law and finance literature suggesting that 
strong legal protection for investors is the key to a nation’s healthy stock market 
development and economic growth.  Despite remarkable progress in setting up 
its securities market, China has often been criticized for its underdeveloped 
regulatory regime.  The wide securities fraud scandals that contrast with the 
paucity of conviction rates are indicative of China’s inadequate public securities 
law enforcement.  Private enforcement efforts, such as securities litigation, help 
address the disconnect between the securities regulatory regime and investor 
compensation.  Nevertheless, given the immaturity of China’s current legal and 
institutional framework, various factors preclude private securities litigation 
from playing an effective role in China’s market regulation and development.  
Against the background, this Article seeks to explore alternative mechanisms for 
improving private enforcement in China.  After concluding that modeling the 
U.S. class action system is quite unlikely to work well in China’s sociopolitical 
and socioeconomic context, this Article explores how the present system of 
securities fraud litigation should be reformed in order to balance the competing 
interests of state control, social stability, and minority shareholder protection in 
the listed companies.  In view of the dominance of retail shareholders in the 
Chinese securities market, and drawing on international experience, this Article 
proposes a cost-effective and accessible securities arbitration scheme in China 
for resolving civil compensation claims.  This Article argues that the 
professionalism, procedural flexibility, speed, confidentiality, and cost saving 
features of arbitration offer much potential as a deterrent and remedial device in 
addressing the deficiencies of private enforcement of securities regulation 
during China’s economic transition. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Developing a fair, efficient, and orderly securities market is one of 
China’s biggest institutional challenges today.  Since initial economic 
reforms from a planned to a market economy, a high private savings rate 
and the public’s appetite to hold risky securities have contributed to 
impressive growth of the market.  The Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock 
Exchanges were established in 1990, and since then, the number of listed 
companies has grown exponentially.  At the end of 2011, a total of 2,342 
companies were listed on the two stock exchanges,
1
 compared to fifty-three 
 
 1  CHINA SEC. REGULATORY COMM’N (CSRC), CHINA SECURITIES REGULATORY 
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listed companies in 1992.
2
  China’s securities market, while only twenty 




Despite remarkable progress in setting up its securities market, China 
has often been criticized for its underdeveloped regulatory regime.  Unlike 
its overseas counterparts, which established security markets to provide 
finance to enterprises, China established its securities market to assist in the 
reform of its financially distressed state-owned enterprises (SOEs).
4
  Given 
the political logic of China’s securities market, its securities watchdog, the 
China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC), is handicapped in 
carrying out its regulatory and supervisory mandate.  The paucity of 
securities fraud scandals and the modest conviction rates are indicative of 
the fact that the CSRC has inadequately enforced the law.
5
  Meanwhile, 
private enforcement of China’s Securities Law, such as securities litigation, 
has played only a limited role in assisting the prevention of market abuse 
and the regulation of the securities market. 
Against the background, this Article seeks to explore various 
mechanisms to promote the enforcement of the Securities Law in China.  
Due to the conflicting roles of the CSRC, both as a market promoter and a 
primary market regulator for listed companies, the CSRC’s ability to 
discipline powerful wrongdoers of fraud is most likely handicapped.  It 
would therefore appear that a further strengthening of public enforcement 
efforts is unlikely to be a panacea to the weak enforcement of the Securities 
Law in China.  On the other hand, a large body of law and finance literature 
suggests that strong legal protection for investors is the key to a nation’s 
healthy stock market development and economic growth.
6
  Private 
enforcement efforts compensate victims of securities fraud and help address 
the disconnect between the securities regulatory regime and investor 
compensation.  Nevertheless, given the immaturity of China’s current legal 
and institutional framework, various factors preclude private securities 
 
COMMISSION ANNUAL REPORT 2011, at 119 (2012), available  at 
http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/csrc_en/about/annual/201205/P020120515677609374835.pdf. 
 2  CSRC, CHINA’S SECURITIES AND FUTURES MARKETS 9 (2004), available at 
http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/csrc_en/about/annual/200812/P020090225529630009496.doc. 
 3  CSRC, supra note 1, at 16. 
 4  YU GUANGHUA, COMPARATIVE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN CHINA: POLITICAL 
ECONOMY AND LEGAL INFRASTRUCTURE 23–41 (2007). 
 5  Gongmeng Chen et al., Is China’s Securities Regulatory Agency a Toothless Tiger? 
Evidence from Enforcement Actions, 24 J. ACCT. & PUB. POL’Y 451, 457 (2005) (stating that 
the stock markets’ “legal and institutional framework . . . is still relatively primitive by 
Western standards”). 
 6  See, e.g., Bernard Black, The Legal and Institutional Preconditions for Strong 
Securities Markets, 48 UCLA L. REV. 781 (2001); Rafael La Porta et al., Investor Protection 
and Corporate Governance, 58 J. FIN. & ECON. 3 (2000); Rafael La Porta et al., Legal 
Determinants of External Finance, 52 J. FIN. 1131 (1997). 
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litigation from playing a significant role in China’s market regulation and 
development.
7
  Therefore, this Article seeks to explore alternative 
mechanisms for improvement. 
Following this introduction, Part II evaluates the current level of legal 
protection afforded to minority public shareholders of listed companies in 
China.  This Part will also lay down the background information on two 
alternatives, namely, the introduction of a class action system and a 
securities arbitration scheme for facilitating private enforcement of the 
Securities Law.  To ameliorate the collective action problem faced by 
minority shareholders in filing a securities suit, Part III discusses whether 
directly transplanting the class action system of the United States can 
supply an optimal amount of private enforcement in China.  The United 
States model was chosen because class actions originated there, and some 
other countries have either adopted or actively considered embracing the 
American class action procedures in their recent legal reforms.  After 
answering this in the negative, Part IV next explores the feasibility of 
utilizing alternative dispute resolution (ADR) procedures to resolve civil 
compensation claims.  This Article concludes that the procedural flexibility, 
speed, and cost savings of ADR procedures offer much potential as a 
deterrent and remedial device in policing the corporate misconduct of listed 
companies in China. 
II. THE PARADIGM OF RETAIL SHAREHOLDER PROTECTION IN 
CHINA 
Although China is committed to establishing a modern enterprise 
system to cater to the needs of a market economy, the political logic of 
China’s securities market has contributed not only to the fragmentation of 
shares,
8
 but also to poor corporate governance in listed companies.  One of 
the core governance issues of listed SOEs is their highly concentrated 
ownership structure.  In order to bring its SOEs within the market’s orbit 
without privatizing their ownership structure, the government owned two-
thirds of the equity in listed companies as non-tradable shares,
9
 either 
directly as state-owned shares (guoyou gu) or indirectly as legal person 
shares (faren gu), until the launch of a share structure reform program in 
 
 7  See Marlon A. Layton, Is Private Securities Litigation Essential for the Development of 
China’s Stock Markets?, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1948, 1973–76 (2008). 
 8  To prevent investors from gaining control of SOEs through share ownership, the 
government created various classes of shares—state, legal-person, individual, and foreign—
and predicated ownership on the shareholder’s identity.  See Sandra P. Kister, China’s 
Share-Structure Reform: An Opportunity to Move Beyond Practical Solutions to Practical 
Problems, 45 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 312, 317–18 (2007). 
 9  CSRC, supra note 2, at 27–28. 
 





  As dispersed individual shareholders have no meaningful influence 
over the decision-making processes in SOEs, potential conflicts of interest 




Moreover, the dominance of retail shareholders in the Chinese 
securities market suggests that the risk of actual fraud is heightened.  
Individual shareholders are given limited access to corporate information 
and lack professional knowledge on how to evaluate corporate performance, 
creating ample opportunities for connected transactions
12
 and 
misappropriations of corporate assets, particularly with respect to SOEs.  
Not only is the domestic securities market tainted with widespread insider 
trading, price manipulation, and other fraudulent activities, the impact of 
poor corporate governance has also been felt abroad in recent years as 
Chinese companies increasingly seek overseas listings.  For instance, a 
recent report by NERA Economic Consulting stated that eighteen percent of 
all securities class actions in the United States were filed against Chinese-
domiciled companies or companies with principal executive officers in 
China, and all of these suits dealt with accounting allegations.
13
 
A.  Flawed Securities Framework 
Poor corporate governance is also attributable to the poorly drafted 
corporate and securities laws in China.  Given that the development of 
China’s securities markets is driven by the goal of assisting SOE reform, 
securities laws and regulations have failed to provide adequate protection 
for the rights and interests of public investors in China.  While protecting 
minority shareholders from opportunistic expropriation by management or 
controlling shareholders has always been a critical principle of corporate 
governance, it was not the chief concern of the Chinese lawmakers in the 
early 1990s.  The first corporate code in China, the Company Law of 1993, 
was aimed at providing legal support for the establishment of a modern 
enterprise system and setting down the political agenda of transforming 
 
 10  Shangshi Gongsi Guquan Fenzhi Gaige Guanli Banfa (上市公司股权分置改革管理
办法) [Measures on Administration of Split Share Structure Reform of Listed Companies] 
(promulgated by the China Sec. Reg. Comm’n, Sept. 4, 2005, effective Sept. 4, 2005) 
(China).   
 11  Donald C. Clarke, Corporate Governance in China: An Overview, 14 CHINA ECON. 
REV. 494, 495 (2003). 
 12  The “connected transactions” (guanlian jiaoyi) are paraphrased as “related-party 
transactions.”  See JING LENG, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND FINANCIAL REFORM IN CHINA’S 
TRANSITIONAL ECONOMY 152–53 (2009) (describing the high risk of related-party 
transactions in SOEs).  
 13  JORDAN MILEV ET AL., NERA ECON. CONSULTING, RECENT TRENDS IN SECURITIES 
CLASS ACTION LITIGATION: 2011 MID-YEAR REVIEW 8–12 (2011), available at 
http://www.nera.com/nera-files/PUB_Trends_Year-End_1211_final.pdf. 
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SOEs into joint-stock companies.  Although the Company Law spells out 
basic governance structures for all shareholding companies, the Chinese 
style shareholding system has difficulty reconciling the dual goals of 
maximizing shareholder value and maintaining state ownership. 
In an effort to maintain a fair and orderly securities market and to 
protect the interests of investors, China enacted the Securities Law in 1998, 
which among other things expressly prohibits various forms of market 
misconduct, such as insider trading, market manipulation, and inaccurate 
disclosure.
14
  Substantial revisions to the Securities Law in 2005 improved 
the system governing the issuance, trading, registration, and settlement of 
securities.
15
  The 2005 revision also set down more stringent requirements 
regarding information disclosure and increased the legal responsibilities on 
integrity obligations of the shareholders and other officers who are in 
control of the listed companies.  Following the revision, related agencies 
made corresponding adjustments to other relevant laws and regulation 
documents to ensure they better reflected market rules. 
Although legal provisions have been improved to address chronic 
illness within corporate governance, the law overemphasizes the role of the 
government in the securities arena.  Public enforcement, through 
administrative and criminal sanctions, holds a more prominent position than 
private enforcement in China, despite its inadequacies.  For instance, 
Chapter XI of the Legal Liability Chapter of the Securities Law of 1998 is 
comprised of thirty-six articles, thirty-two of which carry substantive 
penalties in the form of criminal and administrative liability.  The role of 
civil remedies has been overlooked, evidenced by the fact that there are 
only two articles on civil liability.  In the absence of detailed operational 
provisions on how private securities suits can be brought, local courts have 
refused to hear most of the securities fraud cases filed by investors in search 
of civil compensation.
16
  This is the case despite the fact that the courts 
 
 14  See Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Zhengquan Fa ( 中华人民共和国证券法 ) 
[Securities Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. 
Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 29, 1998, effective July 7, 1999) (China) [hereinafter 1998 
Securities Law]. 
 15  See Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Zhuxi Ling (Di Sishisan Hao) (中华人民共和国
主席令 (第四十三号)) [Securities Law of the People’s Republic of China (revised in 2005)] 
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Oct. 27, 2005, effective Jan. 1, 
2006) (China) [hereinafter 2005 Securities Law].  
 16  For instance, a Chinese court dismissed an action against Chengdu Hongguang Co. 
Ltd in 1998 for non-compliance with accounting and disclosure requirements on the grounds 
that there was no specific procedure for such action in China at that time.  Bin Hu & Chenxia 
Shi, Directors’ Liability for False Statements in the Information Disclosure of Listed 
Companies in China, 1 J. AUSTRALASIAN L. TEACHERS ASS’N 67, 69 (2008), 
http://www.alta.edu.au/resources/PDFs/JALTA/2008/(2008)%20Directors’%20Liability_B
%20Hu%20&%20C%20Shi.pdf.  The action against Shandong Bohai Corporation in 1998 
for false accounting initially brought by aggrieved investors was similarly rejected.  Walter 
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could have adopted an expansive interpretation of older pieces of legislation, 
such as the General Principles of Civil Law, to grant relief.
17
 
B.  Inadequate Public Enforcement by the CSRC 
Rampant securities fraud in China does not lie solely in the 
imperfection of the laws.  Overlapping functions of the securities regulatory 
bodies and resource constraints have both contributed to the weak 
enforcement of the Securities Law.  Until the early 1990s, China did not 
have a specialized central agency to regulate the securities market.  The two 
stock exchanges were supervised by local governments, with little oversight 
by the People’s Bank of China (PBOC).  In the aftermath of stock-related 
protests in Shenzhen in 1991, the government decided to strengthen 
securities regulatory oversight by establishing the State Council Securities 
Commission (SCSC) and the CSRC in 1992.  The SCSC was a ministerial-
level government agency in charge of macro-management of the securities 
market and was the primary authority for market regulation.
18
  The CSRC 
was then designed as the SCSC’s executive branch to supervise the market 
and securities firms.
19
  Yet, the CSRC was merely a non-profit institution 
(shiye danwei) that lacked any substantial supervisory powers and tools to 
make rules or punish misconduct.
20
  As such, the securities market remained 
inadequately supervised.  It was not until 1998 that the multi-tier regulatory 
structure was removed and the CSRC became the principal regulator of the 
securities and futures market.  The CSRC’s current mandate is to ensure the 
orderly and lawful operation of the securities market.
21
 
While a nationwide capital market has gradually developed and the 
 
Hutchens, Private Securities Litigation in China: Material Disclosure About China’s Legal 
System?, 24 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 599, 604 n.17 (2003), 
https://www.law.upenn.edu/journals/jil/articles/volume24/issue3/Hutchens24U.Pa.J.Int%27l
Econ.L.599%282003%29.pdf. 
 17  For example, the General Principles of Civil Law provides that tort victims are 
entitled to civil compensation.  Additionally, the Governance Standards for Listed 
Companies, promulgated by the CSRC and the State Economic and Trade Commission in 
January 2002, provides that investors can seek compensation through civil litigation when 
their rights are harmed.  More specifically, China’s Securities Law provides that issuers, 
underwriters and their responsible directors, and other corporate officers can be liable for 
losses suffered by investors because of misrepresentations or material omissions in 
disclosure documents.  1998 Securities Law, supra note 14, art. 63. 
 18  Guowuyuan Guanyu Jinyibu Jiaqiang Zhengquan Shichang Hongguan Guanli de 
Tongzhi (国务院关于进一步加强证券市场宏观管理的通知) [Notice of the State Council 
Concerning Further Strengthening Macro-Administration of the Securities Market] 
(promulgated by the St. Council, Dec. 17, 1992), item 1(1) (China). 
 19  See id. at item 1(2). 
 20  WANG LIANZHOU & LI CHENG, FENGFENG YUYU ZHENGQUANFA (风风雨雨证券法) 
[THE VICISSITUDES OF THE SECURITIES LAW] 49 (2000) (China). 
 21  1998 Securities Law, supra note 14, art. 166. 
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number of listed companies has grown exponentially since the early 1990s, 
the CSRC was not well equipped to carry out its mandate in its early years 
of operation.  There was no enforcement bureau or other enforcement 
offices when it was established in 1993.  Three years later, the predecessor 
of the CSRC Enforcement Bureau, the Complaints Division of the CSRC 
Legal Affairs Department, was staffed with only four members.  During 
that period, Anthony Neoh, the former Chair of the Securities and Futures 
Commission in Hong Kong, remarked that both the Chinese market and its 
regulators were very unsophisticated.
22
  Neoh’s remark was echoed by a 
Chinese top economist Wu Jinglian, who unfavorably compared the 
corruption-ridden market to a “casino.”
23
 
After a decade of operation, the CSRC is much better equipped to 
carry out its mandate.  Unfortunately, its enforcement efforts remain 
inadequate.  To date, it has established thirty-six securities regulatory 
bureaus in the provinces, autonomous regions, and municipalities.  Yet, as 
with other securities regulators worldwide, the CSRC is confronted with 
considerable resource constraints in fulfilling its duties.  In 2006, there were 
still only 289 staff members in the Enforcement Bureau,
24
 compared to a 
total of 1,434 companies listed on the two national exchanges.
25
  Most 
enforcement staff lacked experience and knowledge in the securities field, 
which presented a major disadvantage for them in dealing with the 
complexities of securities crimes.
26
  Even after the establishment of a 
special Enforcement Team (jicha zongdui) in the CSRC in 2007 to facilitate 
the investigation of significant securities fraud cases, and a significant 
increase of total enforcement staff to approximately 600, it appeared that 
public enforcement efforts remained inadequate.
27
  Contrary to the severity 
of insider trading and inaccurate disclosure in China’s stock market in 
2007,
28
 the table below
29
 shows that the number of sanctions imposed by 
 
 22  A Good Beginning, CHINA ECON. REV. (Mar. 1, 1999, 2:00 PM), 
http://www.chinaeconomicreview.com/node/23419. 
 23  JING LENG, supra note 12, at 118 & n.4 (citing Wu Jinglian’s interview on Dui hua (对
话) [Dialogue]: Zhongguo Gushi Buru Duchang (中国股市不如赌场) [China’s Stock 
Market Is Worse Than Casinos] (China Central Television broadcast Jan. 13, 2001)). 
 24  Hongming Cheng, Insider Trading in China: The Case for the Chinese Securities 
Regulatory Commission 15 J. FIN. CRIME 165, 168 (2008). 
 25  CSRC, CHINA’S SECURITIES AND FUTURES MARKETS 3 (2007), available at 
http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/csrc_en/about/annual/200812/P020090225529643752895.pdf. 
 26  Hongming Cheng, supra note 24 (noting that most CSRC enforcement staff members 
lack knowledge and experience in the securities field).  
 27  Zhengjianhui Jicha Zongdui Chengli (证监会稽查总队成立) [The Establishment of 
Special Enforcement Team in the CSRC], XINHUA NEWS NET (Nov. 18, 2007), 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2007-11/18/content_7097686.htm. 
 28  See id. at 165 (finding the paucity of insider trading cases and the lack of convictions 
for insider trading offenses in China). 
 29  The figures are extracted from CSRC Annual Reports, each of which includes the total 
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the CSRC from 2007 to 2011 seems rather modest. 
 
Aside from a shortage of trained personnel and resources, the CSRC 
further faces a serious conflict of interest in its dual role as primary market 
regulator and market promoter of the listed corporations.  As most listed 
companies in China are SOEs,
30
 regulatory efforts of the CSRC are 
muddied by political considerations.  Fearful of a market collapse and 
subsequent economic and political repercussions, the CSRC is subject to 
enormous pressure not to vigorously pursue SOEs for securities fraud. 
C.  Inadequate Private Enforcement 
Ideally, an institutionalized private securities litigation system can 
complement public enforcement activities of the securities regulators.  As 
the primary role of securities regulators is to ensure a fair, orderly, and 
robust securities market, they are not in a position to adjudicate any 
financial remedy for defrauded shareholders who suffer economic losses 
arising from securities fraud.  A well-functioning private securities 
litigation system can provide additional deterrence against securities fraud, 
and simultaneously serve as a remedial device for aggrieved investors 
through the imposition of damages against the perpetrators of fraud.  
 
number of listed companies on the Shenzhen and Shanghai Stock Exchanges at the end of 
each respective year.  See CSRC, CHINA SECURITIES REGULATORY COMMISSION ANNUAL 
REPORT 2007, at 68, 76 (2008), available at 
http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/csrc_en/about/annual/200812/P020090225529644379854.pdf; 
CSRC, CHINA SECURITIES REGULATORY COMMISSION ANNUAL REPORT 2008, at 35, 84 
(2009), available at  
http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/csrc_en/about/annual/200907/P020090701496625000834.pdf; 
CSRC, CHINA SECURITIES REGULATORY COMMISSION ANNUAL REPORT 2009, at 50–51, 111–
12 (2010), available at 
http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/csrc_en/about/annual/201011/P020101105493830315968.pdf; 
CRSC, supra note 1, at 37, 109–10 (reporting 2011 figures).  The CRSC’s 2010 annual 
report did not contain the relevant figures.  See CRSC, CHINA SECURITIES REGULATORY 
COMMISSION ANNUAL REPORT 2010 (2011), available at 
http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/csrc_en/about/annual/201203/P020120315575855936801.pdf;  
 30  See KENNETH LIEBERTHAL, GOVERNING CHINA: FROM REVOLUTION THROUGH REFORM 
266 (2d ed. 2004) (stating that “typically only SOEs are approved for listing on the . . . stock 
exchanges,” resulting in very few listed private companies); Layton, supra note 7, at 1949. 
Year 2007 2008 2009 2011 
Listed Companies 1,530 1,604 1,700 2,342 
Cases Closed  405 130 106 N/A 
Cases informally investigated N/A 157 121 N/A 
Sanction Decisions 54 77 N/A 68 
Companies Sanctioned 26 N/A 23 13 
Individuals Sanctioned  155 N/A 218 198 
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Nevertheless, various systemic and institutional obstacles, such as 
procedural difficulties, an absence of financial incentives in bringing 
securities suits, substantial filing fees, underdeveloped group litigation rules, 
and a lack of judicial infrastructure, preclude private enforcement from 
playing a significant role in securities market regulation in China.  These 
obstacles lead to disincentives for public investors to detect and prosecute 
frauds and assist in the anti-securities fraud campaigns of the government, 
as well as contribute to widespread market misconduct. 
1.  The SPC Circulars between 2001 and 2003 
Following the outbreak of market scandals in the 2000s, the 
inadequacy of the private securities litigation system has become an 
increasingly serious problem in China.  As aggrieved investors continued to 
file suits at first instance courts, the Supreme People’s Court (SPC) issued 
three circulars between September 2001 and January 2003 (collectively 
“SPC Circulars”) to clarify the situation. 
In the first circular, issued on September 21, 2001 (2001 Circular), the 
SPC imposed a temporary ban on the acceptance by lower courts of civil 
compensation suits.
31
  Justice Li Guoguang, Vice President of the SPC at 
the time and drafter of the 2001 Circular, justified the SPC’s refusal to 
allow securities litigation on the ground that the local courts lacked 
resources and experience to hear these cases.
32
  However, the 2001 Circular 
attracted severe criticism from academics, practitioners, and investors.
33
  
Subsequently, this ban was partially lifted after just four months.
34
 
In the second circular, issued on January 15, 2002 (2002 Circular), the 
SPC instructed lower courts to accept investor suits for misrepresentation 
on the condition that the company and the relevant persons had been 
administratively sanctioned or criminally convicted for the same 
misrepresentation.
35
  Additionally, the 2002 Circular requires a lawsuit to 
 
 31  Zuigao Remin Fayuan Guanyu She Zhengquan Minshi Peichang Anjian Zan Buyu 
Shouli de Tongzhi (最高人民法院关于涉证券民事赔偿案件暂不予受理的通知) [Circular 
Regarding Non-Acceptance of Securities-Related Civil Compensation Cases] (promulgated 
by the Sup. People’s Ct., Sept. 21, 2001, effective Sept. 21, 2001) (China). 
 32  LI GUOGUANG & JIAWEI, ZHENGQUAN SHICHANG XUJIA CHENGSHU MINSHI PEICHANG 
ZHIDU (证券市场虛假陈述民事赔偿制度 ) [THE CIVIL COMPENSATION SYSTEM OF 
SECURITIES MARKET MISREPRESENTATION] 2–3 (2003) (China). 
 33  Id. at 113–14. 
 34  Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Shouli Zhengquan Shichang yin Xujia Chenshu Yinfa 
de Minshi Qinquan Jiufen Anjian Youguan Wenti de Tongzhi (最高人民法院关于受理证
券市场因虚假陈述引发的民事侵权纠纷案件有关问题的通知) [Notice of the Supreme 
People’s Court on Relevant Issues of Filing of Civil Tort Disputes Arising From 
Misrepresentation on the Securities Market] (promulgated by the Sup. People’s Ct., Jan. 15, 
2002, effective Jan. 15, 2002) (Lawinfochina) (China) [hereinafter 2002 Circular]. 
 35  Id. 
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be filed within two years from the date of the decision.
36
  On December 26, 
2002, the SPC promulgated the “Several Provisions on Trial of Civil 
Damages Cases Arising from Misrepresentation in the Securities Market” 
(2003 Circular), which became effective on February 1, 2003.
37
  The 2003 
Circular expanded on the 2002 Circular and provided that both firms and 
individuals can be named as defendants in a securities suit.
38
  Individual 
defendants can include executives, directors, supervisory board members, 
and controlling shareholders at a listed company, as well as other 
responsible individuals at professional service firms.
39
  The 2003 Circular 
also laid down procedural and evidentiary requirements for bringing 
securities-related misrepresentation suits. 
2.  Technical Constraints of Group Litigation Rules in China 
By providing a functional basis for investors to bring a private 
securities suit, the SPC Circulars raise high expectations in upgrading 
China’s securities regulatory framework and mark a significant step 
forward in investor protection.  Despite these expectations, however, the 
SPC Circulars have failed to adequately promote the private enforcement of 
China’s securities laws. 
One major criticism is that the SPC Circulars unduly restrict the scope 
of cases for which civil compensation may be sought.
40
  Relief can only be 
sought for cases arising from misrepresentation (xujia chenshu), which is 
defined to include false statements (xujia jizai), misleading statements 
(wudaoxing chenshu), material omissions (zhongda yilou), or improper 
disclosures (buzhengdang pilu). 41   The Circulars provide no basis for 
private litigation based on other forms of securities fraud regulated by the 
CSRC that have been prevalent on the market, such as insider dealing 
(neimu jiaoyi) and market manipulation (caozong shichang).  This 
effectively deprives defrauded investors of compensation even if the CSRC 
determines liability and imposes administrative penalties against the 
 
 36  Id. 
 37  Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Shenli Zhengquan Shichang Yin Xujia Chenshu 
Yinfa de Minshi Peichang Anjian de Ruogan Guiding (最高人民法院关于审理证券市场因
虚假陈述引发的民事赔偿案件的若干规定 ) [Several Provisions on Trial of Civil 
Compensation Cases Arising from Misrepresentation on the Securities Market] (promulgated 
by the Sup. People’s Ct.., Dec. 26, 2002, effective Feb. 1, 2003) (Lawinfochina) (China) 
[hereinafter 2003 Circular]. 
 38  Id. art. 2.  
 39  Id. art. 7. 
 40  See, e.g., Hutchens, supra note 16, at 630–32; Yin Jie (殷洁), Zhengquan Xujia 
Chenshu Minshi Zeren Zhidu Lun (证券虚假陈述民事责任制度论) [On The System of 
Civil Liability of Misrepresentation in Securities Fraud], 6 FAXUE (法学) [LEGAL SCI.] 109, 
110–11 (2003) (China). 
 41  2003 Circular, supra note 37, art. 17. 
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wrongdoers. 
The second line of criticism is that victims of securities fraud may be 
denied recovery due to restrictive rules on proving causation between the 
misrepresentation and the resulting financial loss.  For shareholders to 
establish legal entitlement to compensation, Article 6 of the 2003 Circular 
provides that shareholder-plaintiffs must prove the existence of a causal 
link (yinguo guanxi) between the defendant’s wrongdoing and the 
plaintiff’s loss.
42
  However, causation would not be established if the 
affected security was purchased before the misrepresentation was made, or 
if the security was sold before the relevant misrepresentation was made 
public.
43
  Regardless of any loss that might actually have been incurred, 
defrauded shareholders are effectively excluded from compensation when a 
listed company fails to disclose material price-sensitive information in a 
timely manner,
44
 a situation that is not uncommon.  In such an example, 
these shareholders may have sold their shares, thinking that the company’s 
current performance indicated dim prospects.  In fact, the company may 
have withheld material information, causing the share price to rise when the 
disclosure was made at a later time.  Although these shareholders sold the 
shares at a price lower than what they could have obtained had they waited 
to sell until after the disclosure of the price-sensitive information, they are 
left with no course of action against the wrongdoers under the SPC 
Circulars, not even after the wrongdoers have been sanctioned by the courts 
or the relevant administrative authorities.  The imposition of fines or 
confiscation of proceeds by the administrative authorities could not have 
assisted the shareholders either, because the fines imposed or the proceeds 
confiscated go to the State Treasury.
45
 
Another line of attack relates to the absence of financial incentives in 
bringing private securities suits in China.  The matter of costs does not 
merely affect the efficacy of the private securities fraud suits, but also 
determines whether this procedure will be utilized at all.  From an economic 
point of view, plaintiffs will sue only when the expected award exceeds the 
litigation costs.  However, litigation costs are major obstacles for aggrieved 
investors to lodge a private suit to recover losses resulting from securities 
fraud.  While contingency fee arrangements are generally prohibited in 
China,
46
 the SPC Circulars and the Securities Law remain silent on how 
 
 42  Id. art. 6.  
 43  Id. art. 19. 
 44  SANZHU ZHU, SECURITIES DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN CHINA 186 (2007) (summarizing the 
criticism from academics, practitioners, and judges on the cumbersome causation rule). 
 45  2005 Securities Law, supra note 15, art. 234. 
 46  Lüshi Fuwu Shoufei Guanli Banfa (律师服务收费管理办法) [Management Measures 
of Fee Charging for Lawyers’ Services] (promulgated by the Ministry of Just., Apr. 13, 
2006, effective Dec. 1, 2006) (Lawinfochina) (China).  Article 12 expressly provides that 
outcome-related fees are prohibited in criminal, administrative, state compensation, and class 
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these lawsuits should be funded.  In this light, the general rule is that each 
side bears their own costs of retaining lawyers at the beginning of the 
lawsuit.
47
  Should the action fail, plaintiff investors face the consequences 
of being liable for not only their own costs, but also need to reimburse the 
litigation expenses of the prevailing defendant, including filing fees and 
other costs.
48
  Even if the action is successful, investors may not be able to 
recover their lawyers’ fees from the losing party.  This potential exposure 
for a substantial amount of costs, coupled with the absence of litigation 
funding in China, dissuades many shareholders from suing even when they 
have a meritorious claim. 
Substantial filing fees (anjian shoulifei) further erode plaintiff-
investors’ incentives to commence litigation.  In China, filing fees are 
calculated on a sliding scale based on the contested amount, with a 
maximum percentage of 2.5% for amounts below RMB 10,000, and a 
minimum of 0.5% for amounts above RMB 20 million.
49
  Although filing 
fees are borne by the losing party, plaintiffs usually advance them when the 
action is brought.
50
  Thus, plaintiffs are immediately presented with a high 
expense if they seek recovery of any significant funds.  The problem is 
aggravated when a court decides to hold multiple trials for various similar 
individual claims.  This point is borne out in the landmark ST Dongfang 
case.
51
  In that case, without offering any justification, the court required, as 
a condition for accepting the case, that all sixty-one plaintiffs split into 
 
action cases.  Id. art. 12.  Article 4 further provides that lawyers should charge service fees 
using the government-directed prices (zhengfu zhidao jia) and the market-regulated prices 
(shichang tiaojie jia).  Id. art. 4. 
 47  See Chen Lihua Deng 23 Ming Touzi Ren Su Daqing Lianyi Gongsi, Shenyin 
Zhengquan Gongsi Xujia Chenshu Qinquan Peichang Jiufen An (陈丽华等 23名投资人诉
大庆联谊公司，申银证券公司虚假陈述侵权赔偿纠纷案) [Chen Lihua v. Daqing Lianyi 
Co. & Shenyin Sec. Co. for False Misrepresentation], 2005 SUP. PEOPLE’S CT. GAZ. 30 
(Heilongjiang High People’s Ct. Dec. 21, 2004).  In this case, the claimants sought to 
recover all their attorneys’ fees from the losing defendant company.  The court rejected the 
claim, suggesting that it was “groundless in law.”  Id.  
 48  While Chinese courts generally award trial costs to the winner, such costs are usually 
defined as funds paid to the court as filing and other fees and do not include attorney’s fees.  
 49  Susong Feiyong Jiaona Banfa (诉讼费用缴纳办法) [Measures of Charging Litigation 
Fees] (promulgated by the St. Council, Dec. 8, 2006, effective Apr. 1, 2007), art. 13 
(Lawinfochina) (China).  
 50  Minshi Susong Fa (民事诉讼法) [Civil Procedure Law] (promulgated by the Standing 
Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Oct. 28, 2007, effective Apr. 1, 2008), art. 107 (Lawinfochina) 
(China) [hereinafter Civil Procedure Law]. 
 51  See Li Xinyu (李欣玉), Zhengquan Minshi Susong Xin Wenti, Gongtong Susong 
Yuangao Renshu Shouxian (证券民事诉讼新问题  共同诉讼原告人数受限 ) [A New 
Problem in Private Securities Litigation: The Number of Plaintiffs in Joint Actions Are 
Limited], ZHENGQUAN SHIBAO (证券时报 ) [SEC. TIMES] (Apr. 9, 2003), available at 
http://rmrb.com.cn/GB/jinji/35/159/20030409/966783.html (China). 
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groups of no more than ten.
52
  As a result, it would appear uneconomical to 
pursue modest claims, and therefore most resource-poor investors are 
deterred from seeking redress through litigation and gaining access to 
justice. 
A related criticism is that group litigation (jiti susong) rules in China 
are underdeveloped, and restrictive group litigation rules apply in the 
context of securities litigation.  Article 12 of the 2003 Circular provides that 
in cases of joint action (gongtong susong), the number of plaintiffs must be 
determined prior to trial.
53
  Furthermore, plaintiffs must advance substantial 
filing fees in full when the case is brought, and judgments bind only those 
who have registered their rights to the court.  As shareholders are 
geographically dispersed across China, this arrangement is likely to require 
significant upfront costs in order to aggregate a massive number of claims 
and seek assent from all the plaintiffs opting into litigation. 
This is to be contrasted with the more plaintiff-friendly representative 
litigation (daibiaoren susong) rules under Article 55 of the Civil Procedure 
Law, which allow cases to be brought by an undefined number of 
litigants.
54
  The courts are empowered to organize affected individuals into 
a class by issuing a public notice instructing persons entitled to participate 
in the action to register with the people’s court and opt into litigation within 
a specific period of time.
55
  Additionally, plaintiffs in Article 55 actions are 
relieved from paying filing fees upfront.
56
  Similar to the class actions suits 
in the United States, the results of the Article 55 litigation will be binding 
on those who have registered their rights with the court and also those 
unregistered members who are not time barred from the lawsuit. 
Unfortunately, fearful that listed companies could become a target of 
rising public anger over endemic market frauds, and due to the 
apprehension over opening the floodgates to many complex securities 
cases,
57
 the SPC effectively denies potential plaintiffs from utilizing the 
more robust representative litigation rules under Article 55 for bringing 
 
 52  Id. 
 53  2003 Circular, supra note 37, art. 12. 
 54  Civil Procedure Law, supra note 50, art. 55. 
 55  Id. 
 56  See Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Shiyong Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Minshi 
Susong Fa Ruogan Wenti de Yijian (最高人民法院关于使用中华人民共和国民事诉讼法
若干问题的意见) [Matters Concerning the Institution of Class Actions Provided for Under 
the Civil Procedure Law and the Opinion on Several Issues Regarding the Implementation of 
Civil Procedure Law of the PRC] (promulgated by the Sup. People’s Ct., July 14, 1992, 
effective July 14, 1992), art. 129 (China) (determining that the filing fees will be borne by 
the losing party after the case is concluded).  
 57  Bei Hu, China Urged to Adopt Class Action Suits, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Nov. 21, 
2002, 12:00 AM), http://www.scmp.com/article/398254/china-urged-adopt-class-action-suits.  
 





  This deprives investors from the benefits of 
the economies of scale in litigation that are otherwise available under the 
existing legal framework, and reduces the effectiveness of private securities 
litigation in China. 
3.  Lack of Judicial Infrastructure 
Despite recent reforms to strengthen their competence,
59
 concerns have 
frequently been voiced about institutional deficiencies of the judiciary.  The 
courts’ difficulties stem from the tradition that judges have been selected 
from non-legal careers and have received little to no formal education, let 
alone legal training, prior to assignment to the bench.  Coupled with 
China’s short history of securities regulation—a technical, specialized area 
of the law—it is hardly surprising that judges lack competence to correctly 
adjudicate securities fraud cases.  The technicality and complexity of 
matters is particularly true in securities cases, where, by engaging in 
speculative short-term transactions in the marketplace, retail investors may 
be both the victims of securities fraud as well as contributors to the 
commission of market misconduct.  Not only will judges find it difficult to 
distinguish violations of the Securities Law from non-violations, they may 
also encounter difficulties in applying legal principles and assigning 
culpability across defendants consistently.
60
 
4.  Summary: The Need for Reform 
China has dedicated great efforts to upgrade its securities regulatory 
regime and to further investor protection in recent years, but the overall 
situation is still far from satisfactory.  The SPC Circulars failed to provide 
defrauded shareholders with a cost-effective procedure through which they 
can gain access to the courts.  The absence of economic incentives and the 
high upfront costs in bringing securities fraud suits deterred most retail 
investors from achieving recourse through civil litigation.  Indeed, few 
would dare invest upfront in the high filing fee and other expenses in 
exchange for the negligible compensation that might possibly result. 
According to a recent study by Liebman and Milhaupt, only about 
 
 58  2003 Circular, supra note 37, art. 12; see also Civil Procedure Law, supra note 50, art. 
55 (addressing the difficulties of retail securities litigation by using representative rules). 
 59  For instance, since 2002, all new judges in China are required to possess bachelor’s 
degrees.  The SPC further stated that sitting judges under the age of forty are required to 
obtain a degree within five years or will lose their jobs.  Judges who are above the age of 
forty and lack university education are permitted to stay on if they have completed a training 
course.  See Benjamin Liebman, China’s Courts: Restricted Reform 2007 CHINA Q. 620, 625 
(2007).  
 60  See Layton, supra note 7, at 1967 (arguing that the current legal and political 
environment does not support a greater role for private securities litigation).  
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fifteen percent of suit-eligible companies have in fact been sued since the 
promulgation of the SPC Circulars.
61
  While fifteen percent may seem high 
at first glance, it must be noted that these companies have already been 
sanctioned by the CSRC or other administrative authorities for 
misrepresentation in their disclosure documents.
62
  Because the factual 
finding of wrongdoing has already been made, these suit-eligible companies 
would appear to be easy targets for securities suits.  Yet, over eighty percent 
of these eligible companies have not been sued in practice.
63
  Furthermore, 
only a handful of cases have resulted in the imposition of liability on the 
defendant, while a small number of cases have been settled after court 
mediation.
64
  According to Yixin Song, a prominent securities lawyer in 
China, about 10,000 investors, or ten percent of the shareholders who are 
eligible to sue, had initiated securities-related lawsuits by the end of July 
2006, but only about 1,000 of them have obtained some form of redress.
65
  
The amount of claimed damages represents less than five percent of the 
total losses incurred by public investors as a result of securities fraud.
66
  
Even if regulators have punished some of the most outrageous manipulators 
in the securities market, lax enforcement of the law has led to extensive 
misappropriation and securities fraud on the market,
67
 because the risk of 
being caught and penalized is slim enough to be negligible, whereas the 
potential gain from fraudulent activities can be very lucrative.  Companies 
and other wrongdoers are not sufficiently punished for their fraud, which 
affects public confidence in the market. 
III. EMPOWERING SHAREHOLDERS’ RIGHTS: THE CLASS 
 
 61 Benjamin L. Liebman & Curtis J. Milhaupt, Reputational Sanctions in China’s 
Securities Market, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 929, 943 (2008). 
 62  Id. 
 63  Id. 
 64 Katharina Pistor & Chenggang Xu, Governing Stock Markets in Transition Economies: 
Lessons from China, 7 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 184, 193 (2005). 
 65  Song Yixin (宋一欣), Jiakuai Tuijin Zhengquan Minshi Peichang Fazhi Jianshe (加
快推进证券民事赔偿法制建设 ) [Accelerate the Development of Securities Civil 
Compensation System in China], ZHONGGUO ZHENGQUAN BAO (中国证券报) [CHINA SEC. 
DAILY] (July 27, 2006, 5:35 AM), 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/stock/t/20060727/0535821672.shtml (China). 
 66  Shentu Qingnan & Chang Qing (申屠青南 常庆), Kelong An Lüshi Weiquan Tuan 
Jianyi: Jinkuai Sheli Touzi Zhe Baohu Xiehui (科龙案律师维权团建议：尽快设立投资者
保护协会 ) [Suggestion from the Lawyers for the Kelong Case: Set Up the Investor 
Protection Committee As Soon As Possible], ZHONGGUO ZHENGQUAN BAO (中国证券报) 
[CHINA SEC. DAILY] (July 24, 2006, 9:49 AM), available at 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/stock/2006-07/24/content_4871138.htm (China). 
 67  Zhong Zhang, Legal Deterrence: the Foundation of Corporate Governance—
Evidence from China, 15 CORP. GOVERNANCE: INT’L REV. 741, 760 (2007), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1017406. 
 




The prevalence of securities fraud on the market and the importance of 
investor protection have led scholars to consider alternative mechanisms for 
regulatory enforcement.
68
  Under U.S. federal law, persons with similar 
causes of action and standing are allowed to pool their claims and resources 
to bring one single action after obtaining certification from the court.  
Therefore, class actions are seen as a useful procedure within economies of 
scale to overcome the collective action problem in bringing claims that will 
affect the interests of a group.
69
 
One major feature of the American securities class action system is the 
opt-out provision: persons holding claims concerning questions raised in the 
class proceeding are bound by any resulting judgments, unless they 
affirmatively elect to be excluded.
70
  However, the most beneficial aspect of 
the class action mechanism for potential plaintiffs is that it can overcome 
cost-related hurdles in bringing an action.  While each individual’s loss is 
insufficient to make the undertaking of individual litigation financially 
viable, the aggregate claims of the plaintiff class may be substantial enough 
to justify the potential costs.  To facilitate access to the courts, various fee-
shifting mechanisms, such as the contingency fee arrangement, are in place 
to relieve class members from the financial burden of launching these suits.  
Contrary to the usual costs rule, where each litigant pays his own legal bill, 
attorneys under the contingency fee arrangement charge nothing if a case is 
lost.  If the case is settled or successful, attorneys are paid on a percentage 
of damages recovered, which usually ranges between twenty-five and thirty 
percent in the United States.  Since class members are generally not liable 
 
 68  See, e.g., Wallace Wen-Yeu Wang & Jian-lin Chen, Reforming China’s Securities 
Civil Actions: Lessons from PSLRA Reform in the U.S. and Government-Sanctioned Non-
Profit Organization in Taiwan, 21 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 115, 117 (2008). 
 69  See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b).  Eligible cases under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure must meet four threshold requirements: numerosity, commonality, typicality, and 
adequacy of representation.  FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a).  In addition, Rule 23(b) provides that a 
class action may be maintained if one of the three conditions contained therein is satisfied.  
The first category of action under Rule 23(b) is implicated where the pursuance of separate 
actions by or against individual class members would either establish incompatible standards 
of conduct for the party opposing the class, or practically impair the interests of class 
members who are not parties to the adjudication.  FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1).  The second 
category of action is implicated where “the party opposing the class has acted or refused to 
act on grounds that apply generally to the class, so that the final injunctive relief or 
corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole.”  FED. R. CIV. 
P. 23(b)(2).  The third category of action is the common question action.  FED. R. CIV. P. 
23(b)(3).  In practice, this requirement is met when “the court finds that questions of law or 
fact common to class members predominate over questions affecting only individual 
members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods for” the fair and 
efficient adjudication of the dispute in question.  Id. 
 70  FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(3).  
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for the costs of unsuccessful suits, the contingency fee arrangement 
provides financial incentives for defrauded investors to pursue securities 
claims that otherwise would not be brought at all.  With the contingency fee 
arrangement, the class action system could enhance access to justice and 
provide retail investors with an economic means to obtain redress for 
corporate misconduct in China. 
Apart from economic considerations, class actions also help redress 
the imbalance between the wrongdoers of fraud and minority public 
shareholders.
71
  In the Chinese context, the former are usually connected 
with powerful local interests, while minority public shareholders have no 
organized investor groups with comparable capacity.  The class action 
system can thus help these shareholders overcome fears of retaliation from 
the wrongdoers and assist them in obtaining a remedy should an action be 
brought by any member of the class on behalf of all members.  Seen in this 
light, private securities litigation has much potential as a useful deterrent 
and remedial device in policing corporate insiders.  A growing number of 
jurisdictions
72
 have actively considered adopting American class action 
procedures to promote private enforcement.
73
  In the wake of a series of 
securities fraud scandals at the turn of this century, some Chinese scholars 
have also called for the adoption of a U.S.-style class action system to 
improve shareholders’ access to justice.
74
 
Nonetheless, the fundamental flaw of the class action system is that 
unnecessary and frivolous lawsuits may be encouraged for the sole purpose 
of coercing settlements that are disproportionate to the merits of the 
plaintiffs’ claims.
75
  With the opt-out rule, plaintiffs can commence 
proceedings on behalf of persons with no individual interest in the litigation, 
or on behalf of persons unaware of the existence of the class action.  The 
 
 71  2 HERBERT B NEWBERG & ALBA CONTE, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS 478 (4th ed. 
2002). 
 72  Lisa Rickard, The Class Action Debate in Europe: Lessons from the U.S. Experience, 
EUR. BUS. REV., http://www.europeanbusinessreview.com/?p=273 (last visited Jan. 15, 
2013).  For example, the European Union, New Zealand, Singapore, South Africa, and the 
United Kingdom. 
 73  See id. (pointing out, however, the potential for abuses and economic burdens of 
importing the U.S. class action system). 
 74  See, e.g., Pan Jianfeng & Chen Fuyong (潘剑锋&陈福勇), Lun Zhengquan Minshi 
Qinquan Peichang Anjian de Susong Fangshi (论证券民事侵权赔偿案件的诉讼方式) [On 
the Action Form of Civil Torts Compensation Cases Concerning Negotiable Securities], 22 
ZHENGFA LUNTAN (政法论坛) [POL. SCI. & L. TRIB.] 77 (2004) (China); Tang Weijian & 
Chen Wei (汤维建&陈巍), Fengxi Celüe: Woguo Jituan Susong Zhidu de Yizhi Lujing Tanxi 
(缝隙策略：我国集团诉讼制度的移植路径探析) [Strategy of Limited Application: 
Transplanting Foreign Experience to Reform the Mass Litigation System in China], 1 
ZHENGZHI YU FALÜ (政治与法律) [POL. SCI. & L.] 111 (2008) (China).  
 75  Robert D. Cooter & Daniel L. Rubenfield, Economic Analysis of Legal Disputes and 
Their Resolution, 27 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1067, 1075–82 (1989). 
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combined effect of the opt-out rule and the contingency fee arrangement, 
hence, gives rise to a serious risk that attorneys may simply discover a 
cause of action, find a plaintiff, and then boilerplate a class action suit.  
Given the litigation costs and the disruptive impact on the company’s 
operations, defendant corporations in the United States are often inclined to 
settle low value claims early on, regardless of the underlying merits.
76
  One 
possible consequence is that unmeritorious cases are allegedly brought and 
pursued solely in the hope that the management will offer a handsome 
settlement to rid itself of the nuisance.  Such a risk of abusive litigation has 




It is said that even for meritorious litigation, class actions “produce 
wealth transfers among shareholders that neither compensate nor deter.”
78
  
Class action suits divert corporate resources from focusing on their normal 
activities.
79
  Additionally, significant fee awards and settlement amounts 
result in higher director and officer insurance premiums.  These premiums, 
together with increased operating costs and settlement sums, are ultimately 
passed on to shareholders.
80
  Critics have, therefore, rightly pointed out that 
securities class actions are pocket-shifting wealth transfers by shareholders 
who own shares of the company at the time of settlement to plaintiff 
shareholders of the securities suit that enrich entrepreneurial lawyers at the 
expense of average shareholders.
81
 
Opt-out class actions also present a serious conflict of interest between 
class members and their attorneys.  Because attorneys acting for the class 
will both be paid and recoup significant out-of-pocket expenditures if the 
litigation is successfully concluded, they often have a strong financial 
 
 76  DEBORAH R HENSLER ET AL., CLASS ACTION DILEMMAS: PURSUING PUBLIC GOODS FOR 
PRIVATE GAIN 119–20 (2000). 
 77  The introduction of a class action system was initially proposed in the Finance Bill 
2010, but the proposal was subsequently dropped in the rush for the May 2010 General 
Election.  Class Actions: A Global Update, ALLEN & OVERY (Jan. 18, 2011), 
http://www.allenovery.com/publications/en-gb/Pages/Class-Actions—A-Global-Update.aspx.  
 78  John Coffee, Reforming the Securities Class Action: An Essay on Deterrence and Its 
Implementation, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1534, 1534 (2006). 
 79  It was reported that “between 1999 and 2004, one major U.S. drug maker spent $25 
billion [USD] on legal costs and reserves to fight class action lawsuits, while devoting only 
$19 billion [USD] to research and development.”  Rickard, supra note 72 (brackets in 
original). 
 80  See COMM. ON CAPITAL MKTS. REGULATION, INTERIM REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON 
CAPITAL MARKETS REGULATION 78 (2006), 
http://www.capmktsreg.org/pdfs/11.30Committee_Interim_ReportREV2.pdf. 
 81  See, e.g., Tom Baker & Sean J. Griffith, Predicting Corporate Governance Risk: 
Evidence from the Directors’ & Officers’ Liability Insurance Market, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 487, 
494–98 (2007); John Coffee, Law and the Market: The Impact of Enforcement, 156 U. PA. L. 
REV. 229, 302–05 (2007). 
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incentive to settle in the shortest amount of time possible, and may be 
tempted to accept suboptimal or heavily discounted settlements at the 
expense of class members whose interests they are appointed to guard.
82
  
The risk of conflict is further exacerbated by the lack of protection the class 
action procedure offers class members, who are typically given a small role 
in the litigation.  It is thus reported that securities class action suits recover 
only a small percentage of the alleged investor loss.  For instance, between 
2004 and 2008, the median settlement to investor losses ratio ranged 
between two and three percent, even though settlement payments have 
dramatically increased over the years.
83
  Plaintiff attorneys, however, 
received massive fee awards that were disproportionate to the time and 
effort expended in a case.  In the landmark case Kamilewicz v. Bank of 
Boston Corp., a settlement was reached in which each of the individual 
class members was awarded USD 8.76, while class counsel received USD 
8.5 million in fees.
84
 
The above analysis reveals that, while the class action system and the 
contingency fee arrangement can help police corporate management, they 
are unlikely to substantially improve the prospects for a minority 
shareholder.  The problems that plague class actions in the United States 
may vary in importance if applied in China.  Should a securities class action 
system be introduced in China, it may open the floodgates of frivolous or 
unmeritorious litigation.  It may also encourage unnecessary litigation in 
China which, unlike some other legal cultures, is not a litigious society.  
Additionally, securities suits may be heavily driven by lawyers with a view 
to profit from lucrative fee awards, which may expose listed companies to 
massive private securities fraud litigation on a scale that China can ill-
afford, as a majority of the listed companies in China are SOEs or otherwise 
controlled by the government.  Successful cases, on the other hand, can 
exert inexorable pressure on listed companies to succumb to large 
settlement amounts.  This may threaten current share prices and even force 
the companies into dissolution in extreme cases,
85
 which may in turn inhibit 
the privatization reform process of SOEs that the securities market in China 
 
 82  See John Coffee, Understanding the Plaintiffs’ Attorney: The Implications of 
Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law through Class and Derivative Actions, 86 
COLUM. L. REV. 669, 701–04 (1986). 
 83  It is reported that “[t]he average settlement amount from 2002 and 2007 rose to USD 
40.5 million, about two and a half times the average settlement amount of USD 16.3 million 
from 1996 to 2001.”  U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, SECURITIES CLASS ACTION 
LITIGATION: THE PROBLEM, ITS IMPACT AND THE PATH TO REFORM 9 (2008), 
www.instituteforlegalreform.com/get_ilr_doc.php?docId=1213. 
 84  92 F.3d 506, 508–09 (7th Cir. 1996). 
 85  See Richard M. Philips & Gilbert C. Miller, The Private Securities Litigation Reform 
Act of 1995: Rebalancing Litigation Risks and Rewards for Class Action Plaintiffs, 
Defendants and Lawyers, 51 BUS. LAW. 1009, 1028–29 (1996).  
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is designed to assist.
86
  As the U.S. experience illustrates, these bounty-
hunter class actions may lead to over-enforcement, and hence, over-
deterrence of securities fraud, which may dissuade foreign companies from 
entering the country’s securities market. 
In addition to the perceived risk of abuse, institutional differences 
between the United States and China may operate as a key impediment to 
the modeling of the U.S.-style class action regime in China.  Unlike their 
U.S. counterparts, a major hurdle confronting shareholders in China is 
limited access to legal representation.  The Chinese government has 
maintained tight control over the participation of lawyers in joint or mass 
actions for social stability reasons.  In April 2006, the All China Lawyers’ 
Association, a government-backed regulatory body for lawyers in China, 
promulgated a Guiding Opinion on the Handling of Mass Suits by Lawyers 
(Guiding Opinion).
87
  The Guiding Opinion stipulates that lawyers handling 
mass suits (qunti anjian) are subject to supervision and guidance of the 
judicial administration departments.
88
  A mass suit is defined as an action 
where either side consists of ten or more individuals bound by common 
questions of law or fact.
89
  Lawyers are also required to report to the 
responsible government agencies as soon as they discover any sign that 
suggests potential intensification of the conflict, or any action on their 
clients’ part that may threaten social stability.
90
  The absence of unrestricted 
access to legal representation casts doubt as to whether the class action 
system can dramatically enhance shareholders’ recourse to justice.  
Moreover, the existing legal regime fails to offer a fixed solution to issues 
such as stockholders’ standing to sue and the allocation of burden of proof, 
making private securities litigation extremely difficult to handle.
91
 
A related concern is that most of China’s local people’s courts lack 
independence.
92
  Although China’s Constitutional Law recognizes the 
 
 86  “The goals of SOE reform are not simply to enhance corporate productivity and 
financial performance, but to create an optimal institutional arrangement compatible with the 
reform of a market-oriented economy.”  WORKING GRP. ON PRIVATISATION & CORP. 
GOVERNANCE OF STATE OWNED ASSETS, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., STATE 
OWNED ENTERPRISES IN CHINA: REVIEWING THE EVIDENCE 3 (2009), 
http://www.oecd.org/corporate/corporateaffairs/corporategovernanceofstate-
ownedenterprises/42095493.pdf. 
 87  Zhonghua Ouanguo Lüshi Xiehui Guanyu Lüshi Banli Quntixing Anjian de Zhidao 
Yijian (中华全国律师协会关于律师办理群体性案件的指导意见) [Guiding Opinion on 
the Handling of Mass Suits by Lawyers] (promulgated by All China Law. Ass’n, Mar. 20, 
2006, effective Mar. 20, 2006) (China). 
 88  Id. art. 1(3).  
 89  Id. art. 1(1). 
 90  Id. art. 2. 
 91  1 DANIEL FUNG ET AL., ARBITRATION IN CHINA: A PRACTICAL GUIDE ¶ 24-08, at 702 
(2004). 
 92  Chinese local courts are funded and subsidized by the relevant local people’s 
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independence of the courts as a whole,
93
 local governments control local 
courts through their control of the budget and their power to appoint, 
promote, and remove judges.
94
  This is especially problematic in light of 
China’s current issues with widespread protectionism and corruption.
95
  
Local courts may not be able to fend off local political party and 
governmental pressures, potentially violating due process and independent 
judicial decision-making.  The risk of undue interference is particularly 
imminent if the interest of the government or SOE in that locality is at issue 
in a case pending before the court.  Not only are courts hesitant to allow 
claims against important local companies or persons, claims are also subject 
to extensive oversight by the judicial committee (shenpan weiyuanhui), 
which essentially decides how important or politically sensitive cases 
should be decided.
96
  As judges rarely resist the committee’s determination 
or recommendation, the independent decision-making process is 
undermined.  Besides, the performance of judges is evaluated based on the 
number of cases they process.
97
  Since a class action is likely to 
disadvantage the court’s caseload, judicial hostility towards class actions 
may intensify should they be implemented in China.
98
 
During its transition from a planned to a market economy, and in the 
process of developing the rule of law, better shareholder protection through 
the provision of the private securities class action mechanism is unlikely to 
be feasible in China’s current political-legal landscape.  The reluctance to 
permit private securities litigation, particularly those based on class actions 
involving a large number of plaintiffs, reflects a broader concern relating to 
social stability.  Class actions carry significant political overtones, because 
they are likely to involve politically well-connected local entities or 
persons.  More fundamentally, class actions carry significant political 
overtones in the Chinese securities context.  Class actions provide the 
means through which a group of aggrieved shareholders are organized into 
 
government.  See ALBERT CHEN, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE PEOPLE’S 
REPUBLIC OF CHINA 200–04 (4th ed. 2011). 
 93  XIANFA art. 126 (1982) (China); Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Renmin Fayuan Zuzhi 
Fa (中华人民共和国人民法院组织法) [Organic Law of the People’s Courts of the People’s 
Republic of China] art. 4 (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., July 5, 
1979, effective Jan. 1, 1980) (Lawinfochina) (China).  
 94  XIANFA art. 127 (1982) (China) (stating that while the SPC supervises the adjudicative 
work of all lower level people’s courts, it has no power over their budgets). 
 95  Gu Weixia, Judicial Review over Arbitration in China: Assessing the Extent of the 
Latest Pro-Arbitration Move by the Supreme People’s Court in the People’s Republic of 
China, 27 WIS. INT’L L.J. 221, 258–59 (2009) (“[L]ocal protectionism must be prevalent 
unless the court can relieve itself from the budget constraints.”). 
 96  See CHEN, supra note 92, at 186. 
 97  Benjamin Liebman, Class Action Litigation in China, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1523, 1533 
(1998). 
 98  Id. 
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a class, which has the potential to destabilize society and, understandably, 
trigger anxiety in the government.  Some local judges have even publically 
expressed that mass actions are politically too risky,
99
 and that political 
stability is preferred to other market values.
100
  In this light, Chinese courts 
have historically been inhospitable to investors seeking compensation for 
losses resulting from securities fraud, and it is unlikely they will be more 
hospitable in the near future. 
IV. SECURITIES ARBITRATION: AN ALTERNATIVE OUT 
Having concluded that modeling the U.S. class action system in China 
is quite unlikely to supply the optimal level of private enforcement to police 
corporate misconduct and deter securities fraud in China, this Part explores 
how to reform the present system of securities fraud litigation in a way that 
balances the competing interests of state control, social stability, and 
minority shareholder protection.  In view of the dominance of retail 
shareholders in the Chinese securities market, a cost-effective and 
accessible alternative dispute resolution mechanism may be more feasible 
in addressing the deficiencies of privately enforcing securities regulation.  
This Part focuses on one of the more promising mechanisms in this area: 
securities arbitration. 
A.  The Rise of ADR in the Settlement of Financial Disputes 
During the last few years, alternative dispute resolution mechanisms 
such as mediation and arbitration have been gaining popularity in settling 
financial disputes.  In essence, mediation is a voluntary dispute resolution 
process in which an independent neutral person, the mediator, helps the 
parties resolve their disputes and reach a negotiated settlement.
101
  
Arbitration, on the other hand, is more akin to litigation than mediation.  It 
is a private means of resolving disputes through the use of neutral third 
party arbitrators, who are usually appointed by the disputing parties’ 
agreement.  Compared to litigation, arbitration is less formal, emphasizing 
equity and efficiency above strict observance of legal norms.
102
 
The speed and cost savings associated with ADR offer much appeal in 
the settlement of financial disputes.  Arbitration is cheaper and speedier 
than litigation because, rather than having generalist judges who must rely 
upon the assistance of experts— possibly prolonging the hearing and 
 
 99  Hutchens, supra note 16, at 645. 
 100  Nicholas C. Howson, Judicial Independence and the Company Law in the Shanghai 
Courts, in JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN CHINA: LESSONS FOR GLOBAL RULE OF LAW 
PROMOTION 134, 147 (Randall Peerenboom ed., 2009). 
 101 JACQUELINE NOLAN-HALEY, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN A NUTSHELL 62 
(2d ed. 2001). 
 102 Id. at 138. 
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increasing costs— arbitration allows parties to appoint experts 
knowledgeable about industry customs to serve as arbitrators.  Recent years 
have, therefore, seen an increasing worldwide interest in ADR mechanisms 
to resolve financial and securities disputes.  For instance, in Rodriguez de 
Quijas v. Shearson/American Express Inc., the U.S. Supreme Court upheld 
the enforceability of pre-arbitration agreements to settle disputes between 
broker-dealers and their customers.
103
  In addition, the Financial Industry 
Regulatory Authority (FINRA) offers U.S. investors the option to resolve 
disputes via mediation or arbitration, the latter of which is more popular.  
Throughout 2012, a total of 4,299 arbitration cases were filed through the 
FINRA process, parties agreed to mediation in 572 cases, and 776 cases 
were closed through mediation.
104
  In Hong Kong, the Hong Kong 
Monetary Authority appointed the Hong Kong International Arbitration 
Center (HKIAC) to administer the Lehman Brothers-Related Investment 
Products Dispute Mediation and Arbitration Scheme to resolve minibonds 
claims between banks and investors arising from the collapse of Lehman 
Brothers in 2008.
105
  In a similar vein, the Financial Ombudsman Service 
(FOS) was established in the United Kingdom to resolve consumer 
financial disputes.
106
  The FOS provides free and independent advice to 
consumers on resolving disputes with financial companies.  According to 
figures revealed by TheCityUK, an independent body established to 
promote the financial and related professional services industries in the 
United Kingdom, the total number of disputes that have been resolved 
through arbitration and mediation reached a total of 34,541 in 2009, up 
seventy-eight percent from 19,384 disputes resolved in 2007.
107
 
Mediation and arbitration are also popular dispute settlement 
alternatives in China.  Indeed, as early as 1994, Chinese law has recognized 
arbitration as a legitimate choice for the resolution of intra-corporate 
conflicts in the context of Chinese corporations listed abroad.  Article 163 
of the Notice on the Implementation of the “Mandatory Provisions of 
Articles of Association of Companies Seeking Overseas Listing” (Guanyu 
 
 103 490 U.S. 477 (1989). 
 104 Dispute Resolution Statistics, FIN. INDUSTRY REG. AUTHORITY, 
http://www.finra.org/ArbitrationMediation/AboutFINRADR/Statistics/ (last updated Dec. 
18, 2012).  In 2010, 5,680 cases were filed through the FINRA arbitration process, parties 
agreed to mediation in 823 cases, and 497 cases were closed through mediation.  Id.  In 
2011, 4,729 new arbitration cases were filed, parties agreed to mediation in 659 cases, and 
783 cases were closed through mediation.  Id. 
 105 Gu Weixia, ADR and Financial Disputes in Hong Kong: The Lehman Brothers 
Experience and the Way Forward, ASIAN DISP. REV., Jan. 2011, at 20, 20. 
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Zhixing Dao Jingwai Shangshi Gongsi Zhangcheng Bibei Tiaokuan de 
Tongzhi) provides for a compulsory arbitration clause whereby disputes 
between a Chinese corporation listed in Hong Kong and its shareholders 
must be arbitrated under the HKIAC or the China International Economic 
and Trade Arbitration Commission (CIETAC).
108
  In addition, the SPC 
Circulars provide legislative support for the use of ADR methods in settling 
civil compensation claims arising from misrepresentations in the disclosure 
documents of listed corporations.  Article 4 of the 2003 Circular instructs 
the people’s courts to stress (zhaozhong) mediation while adjudicating cases 
and to encourage settlement of private securities fraud disputes.
109
  Seen in 
this light, ADR could play an important role in handling the large number 
of securities-related fraud disputes in China.  The people’s courts have 
limited resources, but ADR could help ensure timely and efficient 
proceedings. 
B.  The Way Forward: Securities Arbitration Scheme 
At present, the courts are the only dispute resolution mechanism for 
aggrieved shareholders in China to recover financial losses from the 
wrongdoers of securities fraud.  Drawing upon the global ADR trend, and 
bearing in mind the need to improve shareholders’ access to justice, 
defrauded shareholders who have suffered financial losses resulting from 
securities fraud should be provided with an additional avenue to resolve 
civil compensation claims in a cost-effective and expeditious manner.  
Unduly legalistic procedures should be avoided to keep resolution simple 
for average retail shareholders. 
In view of the institutional experience in the United States and Hong 
Kong, a securities arbitration scheme should be introduced in China for the 
resolution of civil compensation claims that fall within the scope of the 
Securities Law.  Even though securities arbitration has not achieved full 
legal efficacy in China, the securities industry has widely agreed for some 
time now that a dispute resolution scheme combining low cost and high 
efficiency is necessary. 
 
 108 Guanyu Zhixing Dao Jingwai Shangshi Gongsi Zhangcheng Bibei Tiaokuan de 
Tongzhi (关于执行《到境外上市公司章程必备条款》的通知 ) [Notice on the 
Implementation of the “Mandatory Provisions of Articles of Association of Companies 
Seeking Overseas Listing”] (promulgated by the China Sec. Reg. Comm’n, Aug. 27, 1994), 
art. 163 (China), available at 
http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/newsite/ssb/ssflfg/bmgzjwj/ssgszl/200911/t20091110_167714.ht
m. 
 109 2003 Circular, supra note 37, art. 4.  The 2003 Circular instructs courts to use 
mediation as a method of resolving cases concerning misrepresentation in accordance with 
principles and procedures of mediation set out in the Civil Procedure Law.  Id.; Civil 
Procedure Law, supra note 50, at ch. 8 (providing mediation principles and procedures).  
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1.  Theoretical Merits of Securities Arbitration 
While arbitration procedures bear many resemblances with court 
proceedings, arbitration is superior to litigation in resolving securities 
disputes in three aspects.  First, an arbitrator is more familiar with the 
securities regulatory regime and the commercial realities involved in each 
case.  Unlike litigation, where there is a need to explain technical matters to 
generalist judges, the use of experts in arbitration allows for speedy 
resolution of disputes.  Hence, arbitration satisfies the securities market’s 
need for an industry-specific type of dispute resolution.
110
  Second, parties 
to arbitration can tailor procedures to fit the circumstances of a particular 
case.  Accordingly, relevant issues can be identified more quickly and 
accurately to avoid unnecessary delay and expenses.  Third, arbitral 
hearings are carried out in private, and the awards are only published in an 
anonymous manner.
111
  Further, arbitration ethical rules require arbitrators 
to maintain all information revealed during a case in strict confidence.
112
  
Hence, arbitration is particularly appealing for preserving business 
confidence.  This is especially vital for securities disputes, as the securities 
market is sensitive, volatile, and responsive to such news. 
More importantly, arbitration is well-suited to resolving civil 
compensation claims arising from securities fraud in China, and thus 
complements the weak enforcement of the Securities Law.  Because legal 
development lagged behind economic development in China, dispute 
resolution based on principles of equity and fairness of arbitration in the 
securities context offers much flexibility to deal with scenarios where there 
are gaps between the law in the text and law in reality (de jure and de facto) 
in China.  The use of arbitration also saves scarce Chinese judicial 
resources by relieving local courts from the need to hear a large number of 
civil compensation cases when a scandal breaks out, and thus enhances 
judicial efficiency.
113
  Moreover, the speed and cost savings associated with 
 
 110 This is particularly true in China, because judges are generally less experienced in 
dealing with commercial disputes.  See supra notes 59–60 and accompanying text. 
 111 Zhonguo Guoji Jingji Maoyi Zhongcai Weiyuanhui Zhongcai Guize (2012 Ban) (中国
国际经济贸易仲裁委员会仲裁规则 (2012 版) [China International Economic & Trade 
Arbitration Commission Arbitration Rules (2012 Edition)] (promulgated by China Council 
for the Promotion of Int’l Trade & China Chamber of Int’l Com., Feb. 3, 2012, effective 
May 1, 2012), art. 36 (China), available at http://cn.cietac.org/Rules/index.asp (providing 
that an arbitral tribunal may not hear cases in an open session) [hereinafter 2012 CIETAC 
Rules].  
 112 Zhongcaiyuan Shouze (仲裁员守则) [Arbitrators Code] (promulgated by China Intl 
Econ. & Trade Arb. Comm’n, Apr. 6, 1993, amended May 6, 1994), art. 13 (China). 
 113 For instance, in the past decade, several highly sensational cases involving listed 
corporations have occurred, such as Shenzhen Kondarl (Grp.) Co. in 2000, and New 
NongKai Global Invs. Ltd. and Xin Jiang Hops Co. in 2003.  Numerous lawsuits have been 
filed against these listed corporations, which have been involved in corporate malpractice.  
Unfortunately, the process of settling these lawsuits is often blocked by procedural issues. 
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arbitration offer a practical and economic alternative for most resource-poor 
Chinese retail investors to police corporate behavior.  Economic analysis of 
law has occupied an outstanding position in securities research.  When 
determining the pros and cons of a particular dispute resolution mechanism 
related to securities in China, arbitration is expected to prosper because it 
can offer the most synergies in terms of efficiency and cost saving.  
Securities arbitration therefore has the potential to improve shareholders’ 
access to justice in China.
114
 
Stability of the securities market is a particularly important goal in 
China, because the securities market is still in its infant stage.  Arbitration 
may help China realize this goal.  As mentioned before, arbitration keeps 
disputes confidential, preventing sensitive information from becoming 
widespread.  Through the confidential and stable process of arbitration, 
greater stability in the securities market may be achieved at minimal cost 
and maximum efficiency.  Therefore, arbitration may serve to both protect 
the interests of minority shareholders and maintain social order in the 
securities market.
115




2.  Institutional Setup of the Securities Arbitration Scheme 
Creating a new entity at the national level to oversee the securities 
arbitration scheme would be a costly and time-consuming option.  For this 
purpose, it would be most cost effective for future civil compensation 
claims to be woven into one of the pre-existing arbitration resources in 
China.  This Article suggests that China International Economic and Trade 
Arbitration Commission is the most appropriate forum for the following 
reasons. 
CIETAC is the most experienced forum for commercial arbitration in 
China, and handles the majority of such disputes at a price that general 
market players can afford.
117
  CIETAC was founded in 1956 under the 
auspices of the China Council for the Promotion of International Trade 
(CCPIT) to aid the CCPIT in promoting international trade by providing an 
impartial forum for resolving foreign-related disputes.  Since then, it has 
transformed from a quasi-judicial dispute resolution body to a truly modern 
 
before the substantive issues are treated and damages are paid.  See 1 FUNG ET AL., supra 
note 91, ¶ 24-04, at 700–01. 
 114 Id. ¶ 24-20. 
 115 Id. ¶ 24-25. 
 116 Confidentiality is another aspect of arbitration that China may desire because China 
often does not favor public exposure of its companies. 
 117 LIJUN CAO, THE FOUND. FOR LAW, JUSTICE & SOC’Y, CIETAC AS A FORUM FOR 
RESOLVING BUSINESS DISPUTES 1–2 (2008), 
http://www.fljs.org/sites/www.fljs.org/files/publications/FLJ%2BS%20Cao%20pb_c.pdf. 
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international commercial arbitration institution.  Currently, it is the largest 
and busiest arbitration institution in the world in terms of annual 
caseload.
118
  It is also the leading arbitration commission in China, 
administering a wide array of domestic and foreign-related disputes, 
including disputes that involve international trade and investment, financial 
leasing, and service contracts.
119
 
CIETAC’s popularity in the international arbitration community can 
partly be explained by its commitment to bring its arbitration procedures in 
line with international practice and standards.  The CIETAC Rules have 
been revised seven times since its inception, and its 2005 amendments 
(2005 CIETAC Rules) addressed some of the most common criticisms of 
CIETAC procedures.
120
  Most noticeably, for the first time, a procedure was 
introduced for the selection and appointment of arbitrators not listed in the 
CIETAC Arbitrator Panel (zhongcaiyuan mingce). 121   Prior to the 
introduction of this rule, CIETAC had adopted the panel system, where 
only those CIETAC-Panel-listed arbitrators could be appointed.
122
  This 
widening of potential arbitrators will dramatically increase the pool of 
experts and foreigners available to serve on a CIETAC tribunal and will 
have a significant practical impact on increasing the parties’ procedural 
autonomy.
123
  Although CIETAC must confirm such an appointment,
124
 in 
the words of one scholar, “such confirmation is more of a formality and the 
appointment of foreign arbitrators is most unlikely to be objected without a 
good reason.”
125
  This reform was coupled with measures to strengthen 
arbitrator impartiality.  The 2005 CIETAC Rules provide that an appointed 
arbitrator must declare any matters that may raise reasonable doubts about 
his or her independence and impartiality and request withdrawal.
126
  This 
should enhance the independence of the arbitrators.  In May 2012, CIETAC 
carried out further amendments to its arbitration rules (2012 CIETAC Rules) 
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Xiuding) (中国国际经济贸易仲裁委员会仲裁规则 (2005 修订)) [China International 
Economic & Trade Arbitration Commission Arbitration Rules (2005 Revision)] art. 21(2) 
(promulgated by China Council for the Promotion of Int’l Trade/China Chamber of Int’l 
Commerce, Jan. 11, 2005, effective May 1, 2005) (Lawinfochina) (China) [hereinafter 2005 
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Analysis of Chinese Adaptation to Globalization, 25 J. INT’L ARB. 121, 146 (2008). 
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in accordance with developments in the Chinese market, in particular, to 
reflect the international trend of enhancing flexibility of arbitral 
proceedings.
127
  The 2012 CIETAC Rules, following the lead of the 2005 
CIETAC Rules, put greater emphasis on arbitrator impartiality.  For 
example, Article 28 of the 2012 CIETAC Rules requires the CIETAC 
Chairman, for the first time, to consider the nationalities of the parties when 
appointing an arbitrator in the absence of the party agreement.
128
 
Aside from its emphasis on due process, CIETAC has maintained its 
institutional independence to a large extent.  Unlike many local arbitration 
commissions—which are financially sponsored by the local treasuries and 
hence reliant on the local government for survival and development
129
— 
CIETAC has retained its financial autonomy.  The steady increase of the 
arbitration caseload has generated impressive income from arbitration fees, 
and as such, CIETAC is less prone to administrative interference.
130
 
From a functional point of view, CIETAC is best equipped to hear 
securities disputes because it has accumulated experience in handling 
securities and financial disputes over decades.  As early as 1994, the State 
Council Securities Commission, the predecessor of CSRC, had designated 
CIETAC as the arbitral tribunal for disputes between securities firms or 
between securities firms and stock exchanges.
131
  At the time of this 
designation, the Securities Law was still being drafted.  The 1993 draft of 
the Securities Law proposed that a securities arbitration commission be set 
up within the China Securities Association, but this proposal was ultimately 
removed from the 1994 draft of the Securities Law.
132
  Both the 1998 
Securities Law and 2005 Securities Law failed to mention this earlier 
proposal to establish a specialized securities dispute arbitration tribunal.
133
  
On the other hand, the State has emphasized CIETAC as a forum for 
resolving securities disputes. 
As a national arbitration commission, CIETAC is headquartered in 
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仲裁委员会为证券争议仲裁机构的通知) [Notice of the SCSC on Designation of CIETAC 
as Arbitration Organization for Securities Disputes] (promulgated by the Sec. Comm’n of 
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It has also established twenty-one liaison offices in different regions and in 
different business sectors to promote its arbitration practice.
135
  Its broad 
geographical presence and nationwide resources provide convenient hearing 
venues through which civil compensation cases lodged by retail 
shareholders may be resolved. 
Seen from this perspective, inviting CIETAC to be the arbitration 
institution can take advantage of its established dispute resolution 
experience and existing nationwide arbitration networks.  Moreover, it may 
fully leverage the CIETAC panel’s financial and securities expertise as well 
as existing resources, such as finance, manpower, information technology, 
and premises. 
3.  The Arbitration Process 
i.  Eligibility Requirements 
This Article proposes that at the initial stage of the arbitration scheme, 
shareholders should only be permitted to bring “follow-up” actions seeking 
compensation against a listed corporation and other relevant wrongdoers 
after the CSRC or other competent administrative agencies decide that the 
conduct in question constitutes a Securities Law violation.  This proposal 
draws from the success of the Lehman Brothers-Related Investment 
Products Dispute Mediation and Arbitration Scheme in Hong Kong, where 
investigative powers remain with the Hong Kong Monetary Authority 
(HKMA) and Securities and Futures Commission (SFC), while the HKIAC 
is mainly responsible for adjudication.
136
  Retaining the powers of the 
CSRC to deal with regulatory breaches while introducing CIETAC to 
exclusively award damages would avoid duplication of powers and, in 
addition, would recognize the effective division of responsibility in 
financial dispute resolution.
137
  To parallel civil actions, a limitations period 
should also be set so that a claim is ineligible for arbitration if two or more 
years have elapsed from the date of the decision, similar to the provisions 
under the SPC Circulars.
138
  Once civil discovery mechanisms in China 
improve, shareholders should be allowed to bring “stand-alone” actions, 
entitling parties affected by Securities Law violations to take civil action for 
 
Sub-Commission (in Shenzhen), and the CIETAC International Economic & Financial 
Arbitration Center (in Tianjin).  About Us: Introduction, CHINA INT’L ECON. & TRADE ARB. 
COMMISSION, http://www.cietac.org/index/aboutUs/47601fd516b2517f001.cms (last visited 
Jan. 6, 2013). 
 135 Examples include grain, commerce, construction, finance, leather, and wool 
transactions.  Id. 
 136 Gu Weixia, supra note 105, at 20–23. 
 137 See id. at 22–23. 
 138 2003 Circular, supra note 37, art. 5; 2002 Circular, supra note 34, art. 2. 
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the recovery of damages suffered, regardless of the outcome of criminal or 
administrative investigations. 
Critics have attacked the requirement of a prior administrative sanction 
or criminal judgment before the initiation of a civil compensation suit on 
the grounds that this requirement deprives investors of their statutory right 
to a private action.
139
  This is because under Article 6 of the Civil Procedure 
Law, courts are required to hear cases independently without interference 
from administrative agencies.
140
  Given that the securities market in China 
was intended to serve the economic goals of the State, it is conceivable that 
the prior decision requirement may create opportunities for alleged 
wrongdoers to escape civil liability by influencing the administrative or 
criminal investigation process through their connections (guanxi).
141
  This 
would limit civil litigation rights and the availability of compensation to 
defrauded investors who suffer economic losses.  Moreover, according to 
Zhu, changing government policies may prevail through administrative 
agencies at the cost of public investors’ legal rights and interests.
142
 
These are indeed valid criticisms of the securities enforcement regime 
in China.  However, the prior decision requirement is justifiable as a 
temporary feature of the securities arbitration system in view of the high 
information costs to bring securities fraud litigation.  The stock market in 
China is heavily dominated by retail investors who lack the requisite skills 
and means to detect securities fraud.  Not only do they have limited access 
to internal corporate documents,
143
 but there is also an absence of an 
elaborate discovery mechanism in China, which is likely to place potential 
claimants in a disadvantaged position in attempting to ferret out the 
information necessary to establish a claim.  For instance, although the Civil 
Procedure Law empowers litigant representatives to investigate, collect 
evidence, and inspect the files of a case in question, the Supreme People’s 
Court formulates the scope and procedure for inspection.
144
  In addition, 
 
 139 See, e.g., Guiping Lu, Private Enforcement of Securities Fraud Law in China: A 
Critique of the Supreme People’s Court 2003 Provisions Concerning Private Securities 
Litigation, 12 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y 781, 797 (2003).  
  140 Civil Procedure Law, supra note 50, art. 6. 
 141 Guiping Lu, supra note 140, at 795–98. 
 142 SANZHU ZHU, supra note 44, at 204. 
 143 For instance, Article 34 of the Company Law provides that shareholders are allowed 
to consult and copy the articles of association, records of shareholder meetings, resolutions 
of board meetings, and financial reports.  Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Gongsi Fa (中华人
民共和国公司法) [Company Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the 
Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Oct. 27, 2005, effective Jan. 1, 2006), art. 34 
(China).  Shareholders are entitled access to the company’s accounting books upon 
submitting a written request stating their motives, but the company has the discretion to 
decline such a request if it finds the request as being pursuant to any improper purpose that 
may damage the legitimate interest of the company.  Id. 
 144 Civil Procedure Law, supra note 50, art. 61.  
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parties have no duty to respond to the adverse party’s requests to produce 
documents, depose witnesses, or even answer questions prior to trial.  
Production of evidence may be compelled only when the people’s court 
considers it necessary for adjudicating the case in question.
145
  As defrauded 
shareholders lack the means to obtain information about the fraud or 
misconduct at issue, they can avert difficulties in gathering the necessary 
information to prove their case if they can rely on evidence gathered during 
the criminal or administrative investigations.  Even in the United States, 
where information costs are arguably lower, a 2003 study by Cox, Thomas, 
and Kiku shows that enforcement actions by the U.S. Securities Exchange 




While the CSRC and other administrative authorities are subject to 
conflicts of interest arising from the ownership structure of the listed 
companies in China, the policy dynamics are complex.  Having pursued 
market-oriented reforms for more than twenty years, some Chinese leaders 
may find private securities enforcement a useful tool to play upon local 
protectionism.  In this regard, it is noteworthy that the CSRC has taken a 
more active role in recent years in improving corporate governance within 
listed companies.  In March 2007, the CSRC started a three-year campaign 
to strengthen corporate governance within listed companies.
147
  During the 
campaign, listed companies looked into existing corporate governance 
problems, including misappropriation of corporate funds, inadequate 
internal controls, and irregular operations at meetings of directors, 
shareholders, and supervisory boards.  The listed companies then made 
rectification measures.
148
  It was reported that this campaign resolved many 
governance problems and promoted a culture of corporate and shareholder 
autonomy.
149
  The report also stated that the listed companies gained greater 




ii.  The Arbitration Procedure 
CIETAC should devise a set of procedural rules in line with its 2012 
 
 145 Id. art. 64.  
 146 James Cox, Randall Thomas & Dana Kiku, SEC Enforcement Heuristics: An 
Empirical Inquiry, 53 DUKE L.J. 737, 763 (2003). 
 147 CORP. GOVERNANCE COMM., ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., Pub. No. 
DAF/CA/CG(2010)3/REV2, CHINA COUNTRY STUDY: SELF-ASSESSMENT AGAINST THE 
OECD PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 6–8 (2011), 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/43/52/46931890.pdf.  
 148 Id. 
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Arbitration Rules to administer claims arising out of the securities 
arbitration scheme.
151
  In order to commence an action, potential claimants 
should submit an arbitration application together with filing fees.  Upon 
receipt of the claim and fees, CIETAC’s Secretariat decides whether the 
case is eligible to proceed.  In this regard, CIETAC’s Secretariat has the 
discretion not to process cases that are clearly frivolous or vexatious.  
Arbitration proceedings should commence only after the Secretariat has 
decided that proper requirements have been complied with. 
Once a case is accepted, either party may request CIETAC to 
informally resolve the claim through mediation prior to the appointment of 
an arbitral tribunal.  If both parties agree to mediate, they will proceed to 
select a mediator and attempt to reach an agreement.  If the mediation 
process is successful the parties will sign a settlement agreement, the terms 
of which may be incorporated into and issued as an arbitral award.  Where 
the mediation process does not result in a settlement, arbitration 
proceedings will resume.  Regardless of the outcome of a mediation process, 
however, nothing exchanged between the parties or the mediator may be 
relied on by the parties in subsequent judicial or arbitration proceedings 
unless the parties agree otherwise.  Additionally, the claimant will be barred 
from litigating the case further in court after arbitration.
152
 
Where mediation is unsuccessful, the parties will proceed to select and 
appoint arbitrators.  Depending on the amount of damages claimed and the 
parties’ wishes, a case may be heard by a mutually agreed-upon arbitrator 
or a panel of three arbitrators;
153
 the latter choice of an arbitration tribunal is 
more common.  To further inject public confidence into the securities 
arbitration scheme, CIETAC should impose additional safeguards in the 
arbitrator selection process beyond the requirements of the 2012 CIETAC 
Rules.  CIETAC should provide parties with information on each 
arbitrator’s education, employment history, prior arbitration awards, and 
other relevant background information during the arbitrator selection 
process.  The parties could use the information to strike arbitrators with 




As the Hong Kong Lehman Brothers-Related Investment Products 
 
 151 See 2012 CIETAC Rules, supra note 111. 
 152 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Zhongcai Fa (中国人民共和国仲裁法) [Arbitration 
Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s 
Cong., Aug. 31, 1994, effective Sept. 1, 1995) (China), art. 5, available at 
http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/12/content_1383756.htm [hereinafter 
Arbitration Law].  
 153 Id. art. 30.  
 154 2012 CIETAC Rules, supra note 111, arts. 24–28.  For background information on the 
arbitration procedure, see Geoffrey Chan & Terence Tung, Commencement of Arbitration 
and Arbitration Proceedings, in 1 FUNG ET AL., supra note 91, ¶¶ 9-01 to 9-06, at 137–38. 
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Dispute Mediation and Arbitration Scheme reveals, adopting a complaints-
based approach in dealing with a multitude of individual cases may result in 
a slow dispute resolution process.
155
  In this light, procedural rules should 
be fine-tuned and group arbitration rules should be incorporated to 
accommodate a number of claims involving similar questions of law or 
fact.
156
  In these cases, the first part of the proceeding should deal with the 
issue of the defendant’s liability, and the second part of the proceeding 
should deal with the application of legal principles to individual cases, and 
where appropriate, the assessment of damages to be paid to individual 
members. 
Finally, this Article proposes charging both securities arbitration 
claimants and defendants a fee similar to the existing fee structure for 
CIETAC arbitrations.  The charge is intended to cover the arbitrator’s fees 
as well as CIETAC’s administrative expenses.  It is envisaged that the 
enhanced private enforcement through arbitration will encourage more 
corporate compliance in China.  Greater shareholder protection can, in turn, 
change China’s business culture and macroeconomics in the long run. 
iii.  Relationship with the Securities Regulators 
Structurally, the securities arbitration scheme and the securities 
regulators should be operationally independent so as to prevent any political 
and administrative intervention.  For this purpose, it is desirable that, 
instead of being under the shelter of the political party or the central 
government, the securities arbitration scheme operates exclusively on its 
arbitration fees revenue. 
The relevant securities regulators, such as the CSRC and China’s two 
stock exchanges in Shanghai and Shenzhen, should, however, maintain 
strategic oversight of the securities arbitration scheme.  In this light, these 
regulatory authorities should be empowered in the rulemaking arena to 
ensure that the enforcement initiatives under the arbitration scheme are 
complementary to the goals of securities regulation.  On the other hand, to 
avoid duplicative efforts and the blurring of their respective roles, CIETAC 
should not have any investigative or disciplinary powers, which are instead 
within the exclusive purview of the securities regulators.  CIETAC should 
be charged solely with the responsibility of handling civil compensation 
 
 155 See Douglas Arner et al., Financial Regulation in Hong Kong: Time for a Change, 5 
ASIAN J. COMP. L. 1, 33 (2010).  
 156 Because securities litigation is substantially dependent upon group litigation, group 
arbitration in securities disputes is highly desired.  This is exemplified by the importance of 
the group securities litigation statutes in the United States.  See Private Securities Litigation 
Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 
77k, 77l, 77z-1, 77z-2, 78a, 78j-1, 78t, 78u, 78u-4, 78u-5 (2006)); Securities Litigation 
Standards Act of 1998, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77p, 78bb(f) (2006) (amended 2010).   
 
Securities Arbitration in China 
33:283 (2013) 
317 
claims arising from securities fraud, and as such, will not issue fines, 
impose sanctions, or take disciplinary actions. 
iv.  Implementation of the Securities Arbitration Scheme 
In the initial stage of the arbitration scheme, a pilot scheme should be 
launched to test the effectiveness of arbitration in resolving civil securities 
fraud disputes in China.  This pilot scheme is suggested to last for three 
years to inform the investing public and other parties concerned about 
securities arbitration.  After three years, a full evaluation of the pilot scheme 
could then be made.  If the scheme is successful, this Article suggests that 
the Chinese legislature pass laws making securities arbitration available 
nationwide on a continuous and permanent basis. 
Since shareholder claimants will only opt for arbitration if they clearly 
understand the process, it is vital that the pilot scheme be widely publicized 
before its execution.  Accordingly, this Article proposes a lead-in period of 
six months before implementation of the pilot scheme to organize activities 
and to promote the awareness and understanding of the service among 
relevant regulatory authorities, the legal profession, and members of the 
investing public.  During this lead-in period, an industry-wide effort should 
also be made to solicit comments from securities regulators, scholars, and 
practitioners to make sure the pilot project is reflective of various interest 
groups’ views.  The input given during this lead-in period would later be 
tested and used to improve the permanent and independent securities 
arbitration mechanism ultimately adopted. 
4.  Concerns of Securities Arbitration 
Notwithstanding the advantages of arbitration and the legislative 
endorsement of this dispute resolution mechanism, a securities arbitration 
scheme also raises a few concerns that warrant discussion. 
i.  CIETAC’s Arbitral Jurisdiction 
Critics may point out that CIETAC’s jurisdiction is limited, and should 
not be extended to securities claims.  CIETAC can exercise jurisdiction 
over a case if the subject matter of the dispute is arbitrable and the parties 
have entered into a valid arbitration agreement.  Articles 2 and 3 of the 
Arbitration Law provide that disputes over rights and interests in 
property—other than marital, adoption, guardianship succession, and 
administrative disputes—between citizens, legal persons, and other 
organizations that are equal subjects may be arbitrated.
157
  Article 3 of the 
2012 CIETAC Rules stipulates that CIETAC may accept cases involving 
international or foreign-related disputes—including disputes related to 
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Hong Kong, Macao, and the Taiwan region—and any domestic disputes.
158
  
Therefore, civil securities fraud claims seem to be arbitrable. 
Arguably, arbitration in China should only take place if the parties 
have previously entered into an arbitration agreement.  Article 4 of the 
Arbitration Law provides that an arbitration commission may not accept the 
case if a party unilaterally applies for arbitration “in the absence of an 
arbitration agreement.”
159
  Article 16 of the Arbitration Law further 
stipulates that an arbitration agreement must be provided in a contract or 
any other written form of agreement, and the agreement must specify the 




In 2004, the Legislative Affairs Office of the State Council and the 
CSRC jointly promulgated a circular on the arbitration of securities and 
futures contractual disputes (Arbitration Circular).
161
  The Arbitration 
Circular is the Chinese government’s most important attempt to promote 
securities arbitration with the aim of making full use of arbitration’s special 
advantages such as expedition, flexibility, low cost, and closed hearings.  
Sadly, the Arbitration Circular excludes disputes between listed companies 
and public investors from the scope of securities arbitration.
162
  As 
explained by respected commentators, a major issue underlying this 
exclusion is that public investors usually do not have prior arbitration 
agreements with listed companies.
163
 
To deal with this issue, an arbitration provision should be incorporated 
in the memorandum or articles of association of a listed corporation to the 
effect that all its shareholders are entitled to elect arbitration before the 
CIETAC as a means to resolve civil compensation claims against the 
corporation.  This arbitration provision could also cover securities fraud 
claims against other entities and individuals such as fiduciaries, employees, 
and professional advisers.  The provision would also include technical 
details, such as the method of selection and appointment of arbitrators, 
forum choice, and governing laws.  For this purpose, employment and 
service contracts between the corporation and its employees, fiduciaries, 
and professional advisers should reference such a duty to arbitrate.  
 
 158 2012 CIETAC Rules, supra note 121, art. 3. 
  159 Arbitration Law, supra note 152, art. 4. 
 160 Id. art. 16.   
 161 See Guanyu Yifa Zuohao Zhengquan, Qihuo Hetong Jiufen Zhogncai Gongzuo de 
Tongzhi (关于依法做好证券，期货合同纠纷仲裁的通知 ) [Circular on Managing 
Arbitration of Securities and Futures Contract Disputes According to Law] (promulgated by 
the Legis. Aff. Off. of the St. Council & the China Sec. Reg. Comm’n, Jan. 18, 2004, 
effective Jan. 18, 2004) (China), available at http://www.gx-
law.gov.cn/news_show.asp?id=1321. 
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Corporations that have already been listed on the national stock exchanges 
can incorporate these arbitration provisions into the corporations’ 
constitutional documents through an amendment.  The listing rules can 
require corporations not yet been listed to include this provision in their 
constitutional documents before they can be listed. 
The first issue with this approach is whether such a provision in the 
memorandum or articles of association amounts to a written arbitration 
agreement as compatible with Article 16 of the Arbitration Law.
164
  While 
arbitration agreements must be in writing, the Arbitration Law is unclear as 
to what constitutes written form.
165
  The 2012 CIETAC Rules provide that 
an arbitration agreement is in writing if it is contained in tangible document 
form such as a contract, letter, telegram, telex, facsimile, EDI, or email.
166
  
Importantly, a company’s constitutional documents have long been 
regarded as contracts between the corporation and each of its shareholders, 
and among the shareholders, inter se.  They are deemed to contain 
covenants binding the corporation and its shareholders while engaged in 
corporate affairs.  As the arbitration provision forms part of the 
corporation’s memorandum of association, the threshold requirement under 
Article 16 is likely to be satisfied. 
The second issue with the arbitration provision approach proposed 
above concerns shareholders’ notice of such a provision.  Effective 
shareholder notice is critical; otherwise, shareholders could not be said to 
have consented to and entered into an arbitration agreement.  Information 
related to the arbitration should be disclosed in the pre-dispute arbitration 
agreement to offer investors an opportunity to make informed decisions.  
One option is to reference the memorandum and fully incorporate the 
arbitration provision into the stock certificates issued by a listed corporation.  
However, many shareholders hold their shares through nominees and would 
never see the stock certificates that discuss the provision.  For these 
shareholders, an alternative option would be for the corporation to divulge 
the arbitration provision on the corporation’s website, within its annual 
reports, CSRC filings, and other disclosure documents on a periodic basis.  
Apart from that, all issuers could be required to attach their memorandum 
of association to each annual report filed with the CSRC under a new listing 
rules requirement instead of making reference to previous reports.  This 
should be required regardless of whether amendments have been made to 
the memorandum in that financial year.  To bring the arbitration provision 
to the attention of minority shareholders, some authors argue that the 
 
  164 Arbitration Law, supra note 152, art. 16. 
 165 Gu Weixia, The Changing Landscape of Arbitration Agreements in China: Has the 
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disclosure clauses should make it clear that arbitration is final and binding 
on all parties, and that parties who choose arbitration waive their right to 
seek remedies in court.
167
 
ii.  Deterrent Effect 
While confidentiality of the arbitration process and award is an 
advantage of arbitration, future investors and regulatory authorities may be 
left in the dark as to the reasoning behind the decisions and the ranges of 
compensation.  A system of arbitrators deciding cases on the basis of facts 
and circumstances available before them may also produce inconsistent 
rulings and varying compensation rates.  Arguably, this may harm investors 
because these ad hoc rulings may limit transparency and introduce a high 
level of unpredictability to the compensation process, which would in turn 
minimize the deterrent effect of private securities resolutions. 
To allay the concern of inconsistent rulings, this Article proposes that 
a system be developed to categorize investors based on factors relevant to 
common disputes.  This could produce common standards of compensation 
applicable to various shareholder groups, ensuring a degree of uniformity in 
compensation awards.  To deepen public understanding of securities 
disputes and increase transparency in the dispute resolution process, the 
regulatory authorities may consider publishing information regarding 
securities fraud claims filed against wrongdoers as well as cases that have 
been dealt with.  However, given that agreements reached between parties 
in mediation and arbitration proceedings are private and confidential, this 
Article suggests publishing only case synopses on an anonymous basis.  
Hopefully, sharing information in this manner will promote greater 
deterrence of securities fraud. 
Another concern relates to the deterrence of unmeritorious lawsuits 
before arbitral tribunals.  To prevent the pitfalls of U.S.-styled class actions, 
this Article suggests providing the CIETAC’s Secretariat with the power to 
decide whether a case is eligible to proceed.  Staff working at the CIETAC 
Secretariat should have discretion not to allow cases to proceed when they 
are clearly frivolous or vexatious.  This screening process could be an 
important means of deterring unmeritorious claims that only benefit lawyers. 
iii.  Enforcement of the Arbitral Award 
Another concern relates to the enforcement of arbitration agreements 
and awards.  Arbitration agreements and arbitral awards must undergo 
review by local Chinese courts for enforcement, but during the transition 
from a planned economy to a market economy and in the process of 
developing the rule of law in China, lower-level courts have not become 
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sufficiently equipped to keep up with the pro-arbitration reforms initiated 
by the SPC.
168
  The lack of judicial integrity and quality as well as the 
unbalanced development among people’s courts at different localities may 
contribute to divergent enforcement records in both court judgments and 
arbitral awards. 
Under the Chinese Arbitration Law, when a party fails to comply with 
an arbitral award, the other party may seek enforcement by applying to the 
intermediate people’s court in which the recalcitrant opponent is domiciled 
or owns property.
169
  Enforcement may be refused or set aside in limited 
circumstances, such as when enforcement is against social and public 
interests or where there are procedural irregularities in the arbitration.
170
 
Importantly, since 1996, the SPC has stepped up its efforts to both 
guard against local protectionism regarding arbitral award enforcement and 
facilitate the execution of arbitration awards.  For example, the SPC 
adopted a series of “pre-reporting” mechanisms (yuxian baogao) in 
handling foreign-related cases.
171
  Under this “pre-reporting” mechanism, 
an intermediate people’s court is required to report its decision to the higher 
people’s court for approval when it decides to set aside a foreign-related 
arbitral agreement and award.
172
  If the higher people’s court decides to 
uphold the decision, it must report its determination to the SPC.
173
  Hence, 
the intermediate people’s court can only set aside a foreign-related award 
after obtaining approval from the SPC. 
This dual regime could invite arguments of unfair discrimination 
against national investors in favor of foreign investors.  Foreign investors 
were given access to the Chinese securities market following China’s 
accession to the World Trade Organization.  Since 2002, foreign investors 
have been allowed to invest in RMB-denominated shares of corporations 
listed on the national stock exchanges under the Qualified Foreign 
Institutional Investor (QFII) scheme.
174
  This, however, contrasts with the 
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enforcement of a domestic award, where grounds for refusing enforcement 
are very broad and could potentially lead to a complete review of a 
decision’s merits.  Furthermore, the fact that the standards for enforcing 
domestic awards are stricter than standards for enforcing foreign-related 
awards suggests that the domestic regime is tougher.  To illustrate, in an 
empirical study conducted by Peerenboom, among sixty-three domestic 
awards handled by one court in a large city in Jiangsu Province, two awards 
were rejected and thirty-five awards were listed as pending.
175
  Hence, the 
domestic regime seemingly needs careful judicial checks as well, at least no 
less than the checks on its foreign-related counterpart. 
To overcome potential under-enforcement of arbitral awards, China 
should narrow the grounds for refusing to enforce arbitral awards under the 
securities arbitration scheme.  Appeals on award should be limited to 
procedural review, which would align the Chinese procedure with 
international standards.
176
  A potentially large scope of review of an arbitral 
award under the local regime will obliterate the finality of the arbitration 
award and obstruct shareholder claimants’ access to judicial recourse by 
further complicating the process for recovering damages.  The substantive 
review invites possibilities of political intervention in the enforcement 
process.  In the long run, the foreign system is conducive to the 
development of the capital markets in China, although “pre-reporting” may 
invite challenges to judicial resources. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Although China’s Securities Law fails to provide an effective private 
cause of action for shareholders who suffer financial losses resulting from 
securities fraud, the SPC purported to remedy the situation by issuing three 
judicial circulars between 2001 and 2003.  The SPC circulars initially raised 
high expectations that they would provide the much-needed judicial 
safeguards in China for minority shareholders.  Despite these expectations, 
however, restrictive procedural rules and the lack of economic incentives in 
the initiation of securities fraud suits effectively deprived aggrieved 
shareholders in China from access to courts and judicial remedies. 
The fundamental issue at stake in this context is how to best promote 
private enforcement while balancing the interests of the State.  As the above 
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analysis reveals, direct transplantation of the U.S.-style class action system 
and contingency fee arrangements raises concerns related to abusive 
litigation and market instability.  In looking forward, this Article asserts that 
a cost-effective and accessible arbitration mechanism should be established 
to promote private enforcement efforts in China for the benefit of minority 
shareholder protection.  The arbitral procedures can and should be simple 
and accessible for average retail shareholders. 
With these principles in mind, and drawing upon institutional 
experience from the United States and Hong Kong, this Article suggests 
that a securities arbitration scheme should be introduced as an out-of-court 
alternative for shareholders to bring securities fraud claims against the 
corporation and individuals or entities connected to the corporation.  The 
absence of alternative methods in handling securities disputes contributes, 
at least to a certain extent, to the weaknesses of China’s securities market.  
By utilizing the institutional and rulemaking capacity of the CIETAC, 
China’s premier arbitration commission, the arbitration scheme proposed in 
this Article stands a better chance of success than the class action proposal.  
Moreover, a securities arbitration scheme can supply an optimal amount of 
private enforcement to deter securities fraud, redress defrauded 
shareholders, and maintain social market order.  Hence, it can achieve a 
better model of retail shareholder protection in China’s sociopolitical and 
socioeconomic conditions. 
Understandably, institutional deficiencies in China’s judiciary may 
invite doubts as to the effectiveness of the securities arbitration scheme.  It 
is argued that lower level courts in China are not sufficiently equipped, both 
infrastructurally and professionally, to keep up with the pro-arbitration 
reforms initiated by the SPC.
177
  While addressing the local protectionism 
issue, the SPC’s “pre-reporting” mechanism may drain judicial resources 
and lead to delays.  In this respect, the future fine-tuning of the procedural 
rules in view of the operational experience of the securities arbitration 
scheme remains open.  But just as every coin has two sides, the limitations 
of the securities arbitration scheme should not undermine its underlying 
benefits as a workable and more effective alternative for private 
enforcement of securities regulation in China. 
Strengthening private enforcement efforts will be critical for China to 
improve its corporate governance landscape and to strengthen investor 
confidence.  In the long run, this improved investor confidence will bring 
about the healthy development of China’s securities market and act as an 
engine for economic growth. 
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